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Chapter 1
Information Percolation and Multi-Unit Demand
The paper examines learning in a decentralized market where there is
uncertainty about common values, and how agents’ ability to learn affects
efficiency. Uninformed traders can learn about the value by searching in
the market and meeting other traders. I study whether this learning
is sufficient to ensure that the trading prices are ex post individually
rational and the outcome is efficient, as search frictions become small.
Past research demonstrated an impossibility of learning when buyers and
sellers have unit demand and supply for an indivisible good. The novelty
is to consider a divisible good, so that traders may engage in multiple
transactions before leaving the market. The main result is that when the
good becomes increasingly divisible, prices become ex post individually
rational and the outcome becomes efficient. Thus, the “granularity of
trade” is identified as an important determinant of trading outcomes in
decentralized markets.
1.1 Introduction
This paper examines learning in a decentralized market where there is uncertainty
about a common state, and how agents’ ability to learn affects efficiency. In a de-
centralized market, different agents may transact at different prices, and if an agent
trades multiple times, she may buy or sell the same good for different prices over her
trading horizon. An agent’s inability to learn the state leads to trades at potentially
different prices, and is the central focus of this paper.
In particular, the paper focuses on the role of multi-unit supply and demand for
learning and for the payoff outcomes for agents. I study this in a model with several
key features. An equal mass of buyers and sellers seek to trade a finite number of
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discrete goods, one at a time, over discrete periods. There is a persistent state of
the world, which determines the common values and costs. A fraction of buyers and
sellers are uncertain about the state. Every period, all buyers and sellers match in
pairs. Each pair first negotiates to trade at one of three prices or not trade, and
then separates. After separating, each agent has a small probability of exiting and
receiving her payoff, and otherwise continues into the next period. After some agents
exit, new buyers and sellers enter and join the old agents.
The exit rate acts as an explicit search friction that incentivizes agents to trade
sooner at perhaps less favorable prices. Buyers and sellers keep track of their past
trades, and regularly update a belief regarding the state of the world. In a steady state
equilibrium, conditional on the state, the aggregate fractions of buyers and sellers
taking different trading positions is constant, and each buyer and seller chooses a
price at which they are willing to trade based on his or her trading history and belief
regarding the state.
By examining steady state equilibria in which the exit rate disappears, I show that
the number of units, or “granularity of trade,” acts as a second source of friction. If
only one of these frictions disappears, not all agents can learn the common state
and there is inefficiency. If both frictions disappear simultaneously, in a sequence of
steady state equilibria, agents learn the common state and an efficient allocation is
achieved.
The seminal paper in the literature on learning in a search environment is Wolinsky
(1990), which examines bilateral trade of an indivisible good. That paper provides a
negative result regarding the possibility of learning: even as search frictions disappear,
outcomes are not ex post individually rational; that is, some agents realize a lower
payoff than what they would have received if they had not participated. The current
paper follows the setup in Wolinsky (1990) and adds the possibility to trade more
than one unit.1 I start by showing a result analogous to Wolinsky (1990) in my model
when agents can trade at most a fixed number of units.
Blouin and Serrano (2001) reproduce Wolinsky’s result in a non-steady state en-
vironment, in which no new agents join the market after an initial period. Their
negative result shows both a significant amount of ex post regret when agents trade,
and that the information asymmetry causes a loss of efficiency. In both of these pa-
pers agents take a binary action. Each of the two actions correspond to one of the
1Two more differences are that Wolinsky (1990) assumes discounting instead of an exit rate and
has a different assumption on the relation of prices and values. The changes are motivated by the
fact that I consider trade of multiple units.
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two possible states of the world, and the limited action sets are useful technically to
simplify strategies.
One way of understanding these negative results is to view information as a con-
tagion. If information can only be transmitted when informed agents agree to trade
at an unfavorable price, information cannot diffuse to all the agents, in a market in
which agents trade only once. I show that in a market in which agents trade multiple
times, agents can spread the information to more agents. This possibility of learning
is a fundamental difference between markets in which agents transact only once, and
markets in which agents transact multiple times.
To compare the results in this paper to earlier results, I look at several benchmarks.
Both earlier papers examine whether or not agents learn the true state; in this paper
I call it information percolation, since only through many meetings and trades can
agents learn. Wolinsky shows an impossibility result by demonstrating that many
trades happen which are not ex post individually rational: if there were no uncertainty,
some agents would not have agreed to these trades. Blouin and Serrano also use this
strategy, and show a similar result. In this spirit I look at the fraction of trades
happening at the “wrong” prices, calling it ex post regret. Finally, I look at the
fraction of gains to trade realized, since as Blouin and Serrano point out, if information
does not percolate, or trades take place at a wrong price, this does not imply that
welfare improving trades are not happening.
Golosov et al. (2014), also revisit the settings of Wolinsky (1990) and Blouin and
Serrano (2001). As in the current paper, the good is divisible. However, offers are
not restricted to be on a grid. The main friction is a possibility that the market ends
in every period, similar to Blouin and Serrano (2001). However, they are interested
in a different question, and study a different limit. Blouin and Serrano (2001) study
the expected payoffs and prices as the probability of the game ending in any given
period becomes small. Golosov et al. (2014) fix the ending probability, and instead
study the allocation in period T , conditional on the game not ending before period T .
They show that the allocation in period T becomes approximately ex post efficient
as T becomes large. For a fixed ending probability, the expected payoffs and prices
will of course generally not be interim efficient or ex post individually rational.
A significant difference in the nature of learning in the current paper from the
learning that takes place in Golosov et al. (2014) is that learning here is passive,
while in Golosov et al. (2014) learning is an active process. In the current paper,
agents learn only from the actions of their match partners, and update their beliefs
using a simple process. In Golosov et al. (2014), agents must carefully select small
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offers at revealing prices, and then learn based on their match partner’s response.
This is due to the differences in bargaining.
Duffie and Manso (2007), Duffie et al. (2014), and Duffie et al. (2010) also study
information percolation in a decentralized market. In these papers, information trans-
mission is mechanical: when two agents meet, each learns all the information that the
other agent had ever learned. While the goal is similar, in the current paper learning
is strategic.
When agents can meet in larger groups, learning becomes easier. In an auction
environment, Pesendorfer and Swinkels (1997) find a positive result when there is a
large number of goods and traders. In a search model with private values, Lauermann
et al. (2011) provide a positive result when buyers search over a sequence of periods,
meeting many to one with sellers to bargain until trading or exiting.
1.2 Model
1.2.1 Setup
The market consists of a continuum of buyers and a continuum of sellers of equal
mass, interested in trading a homogeneous good. A persistent binary state of nature
determines at the same time seller costs and buyer values. There are two states of
nature W = {H,L}. One of the states w ∈ W is termed high (H). In this state,
each buyer has high values vH when entering and all sellers have high costs cH . The
other state is called low (L), for low buyer values vL and low seller costs cL. For
simplicity, the states are equally likely, although this has no impact on the results.
To ensure gains to trade in both states, vH > cH and vL > cL. To preclude a pooling
equilibrium where all agents trade at the same price regardless of the state, I assume
cH > vL.
There are two types of buyers and sellers: informed and uninformed, who differ
only in their initial belief about the state. Informed agents know the state while
uninformed agents have a common prior that the state is high of 1/2. All buyers
start with zero units, and sellers produce a unit and incur a cost for that unit upon
agreeing to trade. Agents are interested in trading a finite number of times. In the
high state, buyers have the high value vH for the first k units (k ∈ N\{0}) purchased,
and the lower value vL for any subsequent goods, while sellers have costs cH for every
good. In the low state, buyers have value vL for all units, while sellers each face low
costs cL for the first k units sold and have higher costs cH for any subsequent units.
This value and cost structure is depicted in Figure 1.1.
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Figure 1.1: In both the high and low states, there are gains to trade for the first k
units. After trading k or more units, a buyer has only low values and a seller has
only high costs, so there are no gains to trade.
The purpose of having gains to trade, v > c, for k units, is to ensure that agents
are interested in trading multiple times. While these k trades can be understood
as multiple goods, they can also be interpreted as fractions of a single good: as k
increases, a good becomes “less granular” and increasingly divisible. The assumption
of multi-unit supply and demand is further discussed in Section 1.4.3.2.
While the value and cost structure for the first k units in Figure 1.1 is standard,
the decrease [increase] in buyer values [seller costs] in the high [low] state after trading
k units is not standard. The value and cost structure should be understood as follows:
for a buyer and seller that have traded fewer than k units, v > c in both states. After
trading k units, a buyer [seller] has low values vL [high cost cH ], regardless of the
state. Then there are no gains to trade between a buyer and seller who have traded
more than k times. Having the value [cost] of a buyer [seller] who has traded k or
more times be vL [cH ] has the effect that agents’ behavior after trading k times is
non-revealing.
Agents may trade in the market until exiting, at which point an agent realizes her
payoff. Uninformed agents learn the state only when they exit, and until then update
a belief based on the actions of their match partners. There are three prices at which
trade may occur, pH , pM , and pL. For each unit traded at a price p, a buyer receives
a payoff of (v − p), and similarly a seller receives (p− c).
The payoffs to buyers and sellers then depend on the number of goods traded and
the prices at which trade took place. Let yH , yM , yL (∈ N) be the number of items a
buyer has bought at the high, medium, and low prices respectively, y = (yH , yM , yL),
and y = yH +yM +yL. Similarly, let z represent the items a seller has sold at different
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prices. Then y or z is the set of past trades of an agent. In the high state a buyer’s
payoff on exiting is:
min (y, k) vH + max (y − k, 0) vL − yHpH − yMpM − yLpL.
The first component of the above value represents the high value the buyer receives
for the first k units. The second term is the low value for any units after the first
k. The last three terms represent the payments the buyer has made in purchasing
goods, paying either a high, medium or low price for each good.
A seller’s payoff on exiting in the high state is:
zHpH + zMpM + zLpL − zcH = zH (pH − cH)+ zM (pM − cH)+ zL (pL − cH) .
In the low state a buyer’s payoff on exiting is:
yvL − yHpH − yMpM − yLpL = yH (vL − pH)+ yM (vL − pM)+ yL (vL − pL) ,
and a seller’s payoff is:
zHpH + zMpM + zLpL −min (z, k) cL −max (z − k, 0) cH .
Finally, each buyer and seller maximizes his or her expected payoff.
Trade takes place over discrete periods without beginning or end. The timing for
each period is as follows: first buyers and sellers are randomly matched, then each
member of each pair simultaneously makes an offer, and if offers overlap in a pair
then they trade. After matching and potentially trading, a small fraction of agents
exit, and finally new agents enter.
In every period, first each buyer is randomly matched to a seller in a one-to-
one matching. Buyers and sellers simultaneously choose actions from a binary set
A = {T, S}, choosing to be tough (T) or soft (S). A buyer playing tough requests a
low price, and a seller playing tough requests a high price. A buyer playing soft offers
to pay a high price, and a seller playing soft offers to sell for a low price.
In a match, if both the buyer and seller play tough, no trade is made. If at least
one agent in a match plays soft, exactly one unit is traded. If the buyer chooses soft
and the seller plays tough, a unit is traded at a high price pH . If the seller plays soft
and the buyer plays tough, the unit is sold at a low price pL. Finally, if both the
buyer and seller in a match play soft, a unit is traded at a medium price pM .
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I make the assumption that
vH > pH = cH > pM > vL = pL > cL. (1.1)
If the state is high, buyers can make k profitable trades by playing soft, and if the
state is low, sellers can make k profitable trades by playing soft. Setting pH = cH and
pL = vL corresponds to the rational expectations equilibrium prices or the Walrasian
prices under complete information.
After matching and potentially trading, an agent exits and realizes her payoff
with probability 1 − δ ∈ (0, 1), and, with the remaining probability δ, remains in
the market next period. This has the effect of exponential discounting, and on the
aggregate level ensures a constant mass of agents. Note that agents do not exit as a
result of trading, and may not opt to exit. This is a non-standard assumption and
is discussed further in Section 1.4.3.3. After a fraction (1 − δ) of agents exit, an
equal mass of buyers and sellers enter the market, and this mass is normalized to 1.
Because exit and entry are both exogenous, the total number of buyers and sellers in
the market is always the same and equal to 1 + δ + δ2 + ... = 1
1−δ .
A fraction α ∈ (0, 1) of the mass 1 of entering buyers and sellers are informed, and
the remaining (1− α) are uninformed. An agent can see all her past actions, and all
the actions her past match partners have chosen. For example, a buyer who has been
in the market for ten complete periods knows his past ten offers, and one action from
each of the ten sellers he met. Uninformed agents have a belief that the state is high,
θ ∈ Θ, Θ = [0, 1], which they update based on the actions of their match partners.
A game is parameterized by an 8-tuple consisting of (δ, k, α, vH , vL, pM , cH , cL).
The market parameters are (δ, k, α), and describe the exit rate, number of units, and
fraction of informed agents. The preference parameters are (vH , vL, pM , cH , cL) and
describe values, costs, and prices.
1.2.2 Steady State Statistics
In a period of a game, there are several statistics of interest. The probability that
a buyer encounters a seller playing soft and the probability that a seller encounters
a buyer playing soft are of particular importance. In a period in the low state, let
τSL be the fraction of sellers playing tough and τBL be the fraction of buyers playing
tough. In a period in the high state, let τSH be the fraction of sellers playing tough,
and τBH be the fraction of buyers playing tough. The proportions τSH [τBL] may be
thought of as the proportion of sellers [buyers] playing tough “correctly,” because a
seller [buyer] playing soft in the high [low] state would necessarily lower her payoff. If
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τSH = 1, then no sellers play soft in the high state to trade at the wrong price. The
proportions τSL and τBH represent agents playing tough when playing soft can yield
a positive payoff. It is tempting to say that τSL is the proportion of sellers playing
tough “incorrectly” in the low state, but sellers who have already traded k units in
the low state should play tough. These proportions will be useful in discussing other
steady state properties.
Also of interest are the characteristics of the populations of buyers and sellers.
To understand these, I define two mass functions B : W × N3 × Θ × N → R for
buyers and S : W ×N3×Θ×N→ R for sellers. These functions map the state, past
trades, a belief that the state is high, and an age (the number of complete periods an
agent has been in the market) to population masses in a period. These populations
are measured after exit and entry but before matching and trading. For example, in
every game and in every period in the high state, B(H, (0, 0, 0), 1
2
, 0) = 1 − α and
B(H, (0, 0, 0), 1, 0) = α. In words, in the high state the number of buyers who have
bought 0 goods, have a belief that the state is high of 1
2
, and have been in the market
for 0 complete periods, is 1− α.
While there may exist non-stationary equilibria, in which τSL or B, for exam-
ple, are not constant, I restrict attention to steady state (stationary) equilibria, and
therefore assume (τSL, τSH , τBH , τBL,B,S) are all constant in every period of an equi-
librium. This will be discussed extensively in the equilibrium definition in Section
1.2.5.
1.2.3 Strategies
An agent starts having traded zero units, and with a belief in the high state of
1
2
if she is uninformed, and 0 or 1 if she is informed, depending on the state. While
trading, an agent observes the actions she and her match partner make, and recalls
the actions she and her past match partners have made in every period in which she
has been in the market. Strategies could be described as functions mapping histories
to actions, but instead, I restrict strategies to map past trades completed and current
beliefs to actions.This restriction implies that a buyer, with a given belief and set
of past trades, who encounters one seller playing soft and one seller playing tough,
and during these two meetings plays tough twice, should behave the same after these
two periods, regardless of the order of the sellers. The purpose of this restriction
is to simplify analysis, allowing us to focus on the beliefs that agents hold and the
trades they have made. Because I will look only at steady state equilibria (discussed
in Section 1.2.5), and allow for mixed strategies, this restriction is only to simplify
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notation and does not affect the results. Strategies are then defined as:
σB : N3 ×Θ→ [0, 1] and σS : N3 ×Θ→ [0, 1],
mapping the number of past trades completed and belief in the state to a probability
of playing soft. For example, if σB((1, 0, 2), 0.8) = 0.75, then a buyer who has bought
one unit at a high price, zero units at a medium price, and two units at a low price,
and believes the state to be high with probability 0.8 will play soft with probability
0.75.
Recall the payoffs:
vH > pH = cH > pM > vL = pL > cL.
These strategies and payoffs yield the following two observations:
1. Any strategy in which an informed buyer in the low state plays soft with positive
probability, that is σB(y, 0) > 0, or an informed seller in the high state accepts
a low price, that is σS(z, 1) > 0, is strictly dominated by σB(y, 0) = 0 and
σS(z, 1) = 0.
2. Any strategy involving playing soft after having made at least k trades, for
example σB((0, 0, k), θ) > 0, is strictly dominated by σB((0, 0, k), θ) = 0.
1.2.4 Value functions
I define value functions that map to an agent’s expected payoff. These are used
to understand interim payoffs and characterize strategies in an equilibrium. These
value functions are defined ex-interim. To discuss value functions and agents’ beliefs,
I start by defining belief updating functions. As θ ∈ [0, 1], let βB : A × Θ → Θ be
the belief of a buyer who had belief θ then encountered a seller playing tough or soft.
The belief updating function for sellers is analogously defined.
I first define cumulative value functions for use in understanding the game gen-
erally and payoffs specifically. I then define another set of value functions, forward
looking value functions, which are used later to partially characterize equilibrium.
The main difference between the two value functions is the inclusion of trades al-
ready made. The cumulative value function of a buyer V B : N3 × Θ → R maps the
past trades and belief to a total expected payoff. It is defined just before choosing
an action, and is recursively defined using the expected value functions for playing
tough or soft, V
B
: A× N3 ×Θ→ R as:
V B(y, θ) = max
{
V
B
(T,y, θ), V
B
(S,y, θ)
}
,
9
with the expected value function for playing tough defined as:
V
B
(T,y, θ) = (1.2)
(1− δ)
[
[θτSH + (1− θ)τSL][βB(T, θ) (vH min(y, k) + vL max(y − k, 0))+ (1− βB(T, θ)) vLy]
+ [θ(1− τSH) + (1− θ)(1− τSL)][βB(S, θ) (vH min(y + 1, k) + vL max(y + 1− k, 0))
+
(
1− βB(S, θ)) vL(y + 1)− pL]− (yhpH + yMpM + yLpL)]
+ δ
[
[θτSH + (1− θ)τSL]V B(y, βB(T, θ))
+ [θ(1− τSH) + (1− θ)(1− τSL)]V B((yh, yM , yL + 1), βB(S, θ))
]
.
Going through this five-line sum, with probability (1− δ), in the first three lines
the buyer will exit later this period and realizes his payoff for trades made this period
or before. In the first line, with perceived probability θτSH + (1 − θ)τSL the buyer
encounters a seller playing tough, and updates his beliefs accordingly. Recall θ is
the buyer’s belief that the state is high, τSH is the probability of encountering a
seller playing tough conditional on the state being high, and τSL is the probability
of encountering a seller playing tough conditional on the state being low. In the
second line, with the remaining probability, the buyer encounters a seller playing
soft. Encountering a seller playing tough or soft impacts the buyer’s belief that the
state is high through βB, affecting his expected value for each item bought. The third
line starts with buying a unit at price pL and also includes the cost of all units bought
before this period, regardless of the seller’s action this period. With probability δ the
buyer does not exit at the end of this period, and encounters a seller playing tough
in the fourth line and soft in the fifth line, and receives a continuation payoff for each
of these possibilities.
Similarly, the expected value function for a buyer playing soft is:
V
B
(S,y, θ) = (1.3)
(1− δ)
[
[θτSH + (1− θ)τSL]
· [βB(T, θ) (vH min(y + 1, k) + vL max(y + 1− k, 0))+ (1− βB(T, θ)) vL(y + 1)− pH ]
+ [θ(1− τSH) + (1− θ)(1− τSL)]
· [βB(S, θ) (vH min(y + 1, k) + vL max(y + 1− k, 0))+ (1− βB(S, θ)) vL(y + 1)− pM ]
− (yhpH + yMpM + yLpL)
]
+ δ
[
[θτSH + (1− θ)τSL]V B(yh + 1, yM , yL, βB(T, θ))
+ [θ(1− τSH) + (1− θ)(1− τSL)]V B(yh, yM + 1, yL, βB(S, θ))
]
.
10
The above payoff functions will largely be used to characterize expected payoffs
of agents.
1.2.4.1 Forward Looking Value Functions
Since trade only happens in one direction, trades already made cannot be altered.
As another way of looking at agents’ expected payoffs, I introduce forward looking
value functions, which ignore the value of already made trades and focus on the
benefit of future participation in the market. A buyer who has traded y times has,
if y < k, y − k remaining potentially profitable trades to make, or no opportunity to
benefit from additional trade if y ≥ k. The buyer’s forward looking value functions
for y < k are: vB(k − y, θ), vB(T, k − y, θ), and vB(S, k − y, θ):
vB(k − y, θ) = max{vB(T, k − y, θ), vB(S, k − y, θ)}, (1.4)
vB(T, k − y, θ) = (1.5)
(θτSH + (1− θ)τSL)δvB(k − y, βB(T, θ))
+ (θ(1− τSH) + (1− θ)(1− τSL))
· (βB(S, θ)(vH − pL) + (1− βB(S, θ))(vL − pL) + δvB(k − y − 1, βB(S, θ))) ,
and
vB(S, k − y, θ) = (1.6)
(θτSH + (1− θ)τSL)
· (βB(T, θ)(vH − pH) + (1− βB(T, θ))(vL − pH) + δvB(k − y − 1, βB(T, θ)))
(θ(1− τSH) + (1− θ)(1− τSL))
· (βB(S, θ)(vH − pM ) + (1− βB(S, θ))(vL − pM ) + δvB(k − y − 1, βB(S, θ))) .
For y ≥ k, and for any θ, additional trades at a low price do not change utility,
while trades at a medium or high price decrease utility, and so vB(k−y, θ) = vB(T, k−
y, θ) = 0 > vB(S, k − y, θ).
The difference between the cumulative value functions V and the forward looking
value functions v is the value of trades already made. Because beliefs, and therefore
the value for trades already made, follow a martingale, given y,
V B(y, θ) = θ
(
vH min(y, k) + vL max(y − k, 0))+ (1− θ)yvL − (yhpH + yMpM + yLpL) + vB(j, θ).
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1.2.5 Equilibrium Definition
The purpose of this research is to understand information percolation and effi-
ciency in steady-state equilibria. I restrict attention to role-symmetric equilibria, so
that all buyers and all sellers follow the same mixed strategy. The restriction to sym-
metric strategies is without loss of generality due to the continuum of agents and the
allowance of mixed strategies.
A steady state perfect Bayesian equilibrium, hereafter equilibrium, consists of
four main parts: populations, aggregate behaviors, strategies, and belief functions. A
steady state is a 10-tuple
(B,S, τSL, τSH , τBH , τBL, σS, σB, βS, βB)
that satisfies two conditions: consistency of beliefs and stationarity of populations,
and an equilibrium is a steady state that additionally satisfies optimality.
1. CONSISTENCY OF BELIEFS: Beliefs follow Bayes rule given (τSL, τSH , τBH , τBL),
that is:
βB(T, θ) =
θτSH
θτSH + (1− θ)τSL , and β
B(S, θ) =
θ(1− τSH)
θ(1− τSH) + (1− θ)(1− τSL) .
(1.7)
Note that belief updates are invertible. Off equilibrium beliefs are assigned
passively. Note that the only time an agent can identify an out of equilibrium
action is if τSL = τSH = 1 or if τBH = τBL = 1, and a buyer or seller never
expects to see his or her match partners playing soft. In this case I define
βB(S, 1
2
) = 1
2
, or βS(S, 1
2
) = 1
2
.
2. STATIONARITY: the populations of buyers B and sellers S are constant, and as
a result of this, the aggregate behavior proportions τSL, τBH , τSH , τBL are also
constant. For example, for a given belief θ, set of past trades y, and time in
the market n, with n, yH , yM , yL > 0, and βB(T, θ′) = θ, and βB(S, θ′′) = θ:
B(H,y, θ, n) =
(1.8)
12
δ(
τSH
(
σB((yH − 1, yM , yL), θ′)B(H, (yH − 1, yM , yL), θ′, n− 1)
+ (1− σB(y, θ′))B(H, (yH , yM , yL), θ′, n− 1)
)
+ (1− τSH)
(
σB((yH , yM − 1, yL), θ′′)B(H, (yH , yM − 1, yL), θ′′, n− 1)
+ (1− σB((yH , yM , yL − 1), θ′′))B(H, (yH , yM , yL − 1), θ′′, n− 1)
))
.
This equation states that the mass of buyers in the high state with a given belief
θ and with a set of past trades y is equal to the mass of buyers that will survive
next period (δ) playing soft (σB) and playing hard (1−σB) and encountering a
seller playing tough (τSH) or soft (1− τSH) to reach the set of completed trades
y and belief θ.
As an aside, from the exogenous exit rate and (1.8), with some abuse of notation
I derive the total population masses:
∑
θ
∑
z
∑
n
S(H, z, θ, n) =
∑
θ
∑
y
∑
n
B(H,y, θ, n) =
1
1− δ . (1.9)
From (1.9) and the exit rate, the mass of exiting uninformed buyers or sellers
is (1− α).
The second part of stationarity holds aggregate behavior constant. In order for
the fractions of agents playing tough to be constant, the fractions must follow
from the masses of agents and strategies, for example:
τBH =
(∑
θ
∑
y
∑
n
B(H,y, θ, n)
(
1− σB(y, θ))) /( 1
1− δ
)
. (1.10)
This is the total mass of buyers weighted by their probability of playing tough,
divided by the total number of buyers, all in the high state.
3. OPTIMALITY: Strategies σB and σS are optimal given (τSL, τSH , τBH , τBL), that
is if
V
B
(T,y, θ) > V
B
(S,y, θ) then σB(y, θ) = 0,
and if
V
B
(T,y, θ) < V
B
(S,y, θ) then σB(y, θ) = 1.
The analog for seller strategies must also hold. Note that because θ can take on
countably many values in a steady state, the optimality property requires agents to
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maximize their payoffs for beliefs that are unattainable.
1.2.5.1 Properties of Value Functions in a Steady State
The following are properties of value functions in any steady state. They are
stated for buyers, but the analogous properties for sellers also hold. The properties
are stated without proof, and are easy to verify.
(V1) For any j > 0, vB(j, 1) > vB(j − 1, 1), and for j′ > 1, vB(j′, 1)− vB(j′− 1, 1) <
vB(j′ − 1, 1)− vB(j′ − 2, 1).
(V2) For any θ > 0, and j > 0, if τSL 6= τSH , then vB(j, θ) > vB(j − 1, θ).
(V3) For any θ′ > θ > 0, and j > 0, if τSL 6= τSH , then vB(j, θ′) > vB(j, θ).
(V4) For any θ > 0, j > 1, and if τSL 6= τSH , then vB(j, θ) − vB(j − 1, θ) <
vB(j − 1, θ)− vB(j − 2, θ).
(V5) For any θ′ > θ > 0, and j > 1, if τSL 6= τSH , then vB(j, θ′) − vB(j − 1, θ′) >
vB(j, θ)− vB(j − 1, θ).
The idea of the above properties is as follows. If τSL = τSH then the actions of
sellers do not affect an uninformed buyer’s belief, requiring τSL 6= τSH prevents this
situation. The first and second properties state that the total value of future trade
is increasing in the number of goods left to trade. Due to the discount factor and
the fact that beliefs of informed agents will not change, (V1) includes concavity. The
strict inequality is because either a buyer has a chance to encounter a seller playing
soft in the high state, or no sellers play soft in the high state, so encountering a
large number of sellers playing tough pushes a buyer’s belief to 1, at which point
playing soft increases his payoff. The third property (V3) states that future payoffs
are increasing with beliefs.
The fourth and fifth properties look at the value of the marginal good, and both
use the non-zero discounting. The fourth property (V4) states that the marginal value
of a good decreases with j, while the fifth property (V5) states that the marginal value
of a good is increases with the belief.
1.2.5.2 Key Properties of an Equilibrium
The following definitions formalize efficiency and ex post regret in an equilibrium.
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Definition 1 (Ex post regret). The fraction of potential trades that take place at
prices that lower an agent’s utility in state w of an equilibrium is xw. In the high
state, this is the fraction of possible trades that take place at pM or pL, so:
xH =
(∑
θ
∑
z
∑
n
S(H, z, θ, n)
(zL + zM )
k
)/( 1
1− δ
)
. (1.11)
Combining over states, then x = max(xH , xL) is ex post regret.
In (1.11), xH is the mass of trades at the “wrong” price in the high state. It is
each mass of sellers multiplied by the fraction that trade at the wrong price (playing
soft). The denominator is one measure of the number of possible trades. In the spirit
of earlier work, this is the measure of trades made that are not ex post individually
rational.
Definition 2 (Gains to trade realized). The proportion of gains to trade realized in
state w is dw. In the high state this is:
dH =
(∑
θ
∑
y
∑
n
B(H,y, θ, n)
min(y, k)
k
)/( 1
1− δ
)
. (1.12)
To combine over states, d = max(dH , dL) is the fraction of gains to trade realized.
In (1.12), in the high state, buyers who exit having traded at least k times have
realized all the gains from trade, while buyers who exit having traded fewer than k
times have unrealized gains to trade (and decrease dH). The measure of gains to trade
used is the fraction of trades that ‘should’ be made that are made. Furthermore, if
in the high state, almost all exiting buyers (almost all buyers in the market) have
traded approximately k units, then dH is close to 1.2
1.2.5.3 Properties in the Limit
The above two definitions serve as benchmarks to understand how agents gain
and lose utility from participation in the market. To understand how agents select
strategies, we must look at how beliefs evolve, and so define another belief function.
Recall that βB maps an action and a prior belief to an updated belief. Let β˜B : W×N
be a function mapping the state and number of periods in the market to a random
2By measuring agents at the beginning of a period instead of after agents have traded, we include
new agents who have not had a chance to trade. As δ grows large, the impact of those agents
disappears.
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variable for beliefs of an uninformed buyer in an equilibrium. For example, β˜B(H, 1)
is a random variable representing an uninformed buyer’s belief after meeting one
seller in the high state, and Pr{β˜B(H, 1) = βB(T, 1
2
)} = τSH , and Pr{β˜B(H, 1) =
βB(S, 1
2
)} = 1− τSH .
For any game parameterized by (δ, k, α, vH , vL, pM , cH , cL) and a corresponding
equilibrium (B,S, τSL, τSH , τBH , τBL, σS, σB, βS, βB), if ex post regret in the high
state is zero (xH = 0), then in the high state, each seller makes no trades at low or
medium prices (zL = 0 and zM = 0), so no seller can ever play soft if she believes the
high state is possible (at any belief θ > 0). It follows that if xH = 0, then uninformed
sellers will not play soft, so not all the gains to trade can be realized in the low state
(dL < 1). As a result, it is impossible in any equilibrium of any game for x = 0 and
d = 1. For this reason I look at sequences of games and corresponding equilibria, so
that in the limit information can percolate and the outcome can be efficient. The
next two definitions provide benchmarks in the limit.
Definition 3 (Information percolation). Information percolates in a sequence
of equilibria {(Bi,Si, τSLi , τSHi , τBHi , τBLi , σSi , σBi , βSi , βBi )}∞i=1 of a sequence of games
parameterized by
{(δi, ki, α, vH , vL, pM , cH , cL)}∞i=1 if there exists a corresponding sequence {ni} such
that:
1. lim
i→∞
(δi)
ni = 1,
2. plim
i→∞
β˜Bi (L, ni) = 0,
3. plim
i→∞
β˜Bi (H,ni) = 1,
4. plim
i→∞
β˜Si (L, ni) = 0, and
5. plim
i→∞
β˜Si (H,ni) = 1.
In other words, if information percolates in a sequence of equilibria, then far along
that sequence almost all agents learn the state before exiting.
Definition 4 (Efficiency). A sequence of equilibria
(Bi,Si, τ
SL
i , τ
SH
i , τ
BH
i , τ
BL
i , σ
S
i , σ
B
i , β
S
i , β
B
i )}∞i=1 corresponding to a sequence of games
parameterized by {(δi, ki, α, vH , vL, pM , cH , cL)}∞i=1 is efficient if lim
i→∞
di = 1 and lim
i→∞
xi =
0.
16
The efficiency concept used is closest to unconstrained Pareto efficiency in a pe-
riod. The necessity of having all gains to trade realized in an efficient outcome is
straightforward. The reason that efficiency requires ex post regret to approach zero is
that if it were greater than zero, for example if a significant fraction of buyers played
soft in the low state, then some sellers in the low state who had already traded k
units would sell a good at a high price, hurting the buyer but having no impact on
the seller.
With these two definitions I can analyze games, equilibria, and sequences of these,
characterizing behavior, information percolation, and payoffs for agents.
1.3 Partial Characterization of Steady States and Equilibria
In this section I find properties of steady states, in order to work towards finding
conditions under which information percolates and equilibria are efficient. I start
with two single crossing properties of optimal strategies in a steady state, then I
establish the equivalence of information percolation and efficiency, and continue with
a few lemmas to characterize strategies in a steady state. I then show equilibrium
existence.
1.3.1 Characterization of Steady States
The first two lemmas will characterize steady states. These characterizations will
be useful to show existence of an equilibrium, and later efficiency and information
percolation results.
Lemma 1 (Strategies involve threshold beliefs). In any steady state, consider any
y, z, θ. If σB is optimal, and for some θ,y, σB(y, θ) > 0 then for any θ′ > θ,
σB(y, θ′) = 1. For sellers, if σS is optimal, and for some θ, z, σS(z, θ) > 0 then for
any θ′ < θ, σS(z, θ′) = 1.
This lemma states that a buyer who would play soft with a given belief and set of
past trades would play soft if he had the same past trades and a higher belief. This
is proven by showing that for any j with j ≤ k and θ ∈ Θ, vB(S, j, θ) − vB(T, j, θ)
is strictly increasing in θ. Note that I make use of the optimality condition, which is
slightly stronger than necessary for a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, to simplify nota-
tion for beliefs that could never be reached. The proof is relegated to the Appendix.
This next lemma states that in a steady state, for a strategy to be optimal, if an
agent with some belief θ plays soft after having traded y (z) times, she will play soft
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if she has the same belief but has traded fewer than y (z) times. This lemma will be
used to rule out certain steady states and equilibria, and bound the number of times
an agent plays soft in an equilibrium. The proof is found in the Appendix.
Lemma 2 (Agents play soft first). Consider any steady state in which τSL 6= τSH . If
σB is optimal, and for some y and θ, σB(y, θ) > 0, then for all y′ such that y′ < y,
σB(y′, θ) = 1. Similarly, consider any steady state in which τBH 6= τBL. If σS is
optimal, if for some some θ and z, then σS(z, θ) > 0, then for all z′ such that z′ < z,
σS(z′, θ) = 1.
The parallel properties also hold if τSL = τSH or τBH = τBL and θ ∈ {0, 1}), in
the case in which an agent is informed.
It is worth noting that the property does apply if τSH = τSL = 1. In this case, if
the parameters are such that 1
2
(vH − pH) + 1
2
(vL− pH) = 0, an uninformed buyer will
never learn, and is always indifferent between playing soft and playing tough.
Theorem 1 (Equilibrium existence). For any game parameterized by
(δ, k, α, vH , vL, pM , cH , cL) there is an equilibrium
(B,S, τSL, τSH , τBH , τBL, σS, σB, βS, βB) of that game.
To prove the existence of an equilibrium, I construct an isomorphic game and
construct a fixed point of that game using strategies and steady state statistics. I
then show that the fixed point exactly corresponds to an equilibrium of the original
game. The proof is found in the Appendix.
Lemma 3 (Equivalence of efficiency and information percolation). Consider any se-
quence of games {(δi, ki, α, vH , vL, pM , cH , cL)}∞i=1 and corresponding equilibria indexed
i,
with lim
i→∞
(δi)
ki = 1. In this sequence of equilibria, information percolates if and only
if the sequence is efficient.
The idea of this lemma is as follows. If an uninformed agent can learn the state
almost surely, then in the state where she cannot earn a positive payoff, she will
not attain a significantly negative payoff by trading badly. If no agent will make a
significant number of bad trades, then no agent has an incentive to wait for trades
at very positive terms that would hurt her match partner. Consequently each agent
will trade at the “correct” prices and realize positive payoffs. Conversely, if an agent
has traded correctly, then she must have learned the state. The proof follows exactly
this idea, and is found in the Appendix.
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1.3.2 Characterization of Equilibrium Strategies
The next couple of lemmas will characterize strategies in an equilibrium. These
characterizations will be useful to show efficiency and information percolation results.
The first of these next lemmas states that uninformed buyers play soft more in the
high state, and uninformed sellers play soft more in the low state. This is important
for bounding posterior beliefs, and combined with Lemma 1, causes agents who have
met more tough match partners to be more likely to play soft than agents who have
met more soft match partners.
Lemma 4 (Uninformed do not trade ‘badly’). In any equilibrium,( ∑
0<θ<1
∑
y
∑
n
B(H,y, θ, n)σB(y, θ)
)
≥
( ∑
0<θ<1
∑
y
∑
n
B(L,y, θ, n)σB(y, θ)
)
, (1.13)
and( ∑
0<θ<1
∑
y
∑
n
S(H,y, θ, n)σS(y, θ)
)
≤
( ∑
0<θ<1
∑
y
∑
n
S(L,y, θ, n)σS(y, θ)
)
. (1.14)
The proof introduces and looks at the histories of uninformed buyers. An unin-
formed buyer’s history is the sequence of actions taken by the buyer and his match
partner. The proof is split into three cases: encountering a seller playing tough can
either raise, lower, or leave unchanged the belief of a buyer. The proof roughly shows
that if a buyer’s belief in the high state is greater, he is more likely to play soft.
Using Lemma 4 and strictly dominated strategies, I bound τ in the next lemma.
Recall that τSH and τBL are the fraction of sellers and buyers playing tough in the
high and low states respectively (playing tough correctly), and τSL and τBH are the
fraction of sellers and buyers playing tough in the low and high states respectively.
Lemma 5 (Bounds on playing tough). In any equilibrium, the following inequalities
hold:
1. τBL ≥ τBH ≥ δk.
2. τSH ≥ τSL ≥ δk.
3. τBL ≥ 1− (1− α)(1− δk).
4. τSH ≥ 1− (1− α)(1− δk).
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Proof. From Lemma 4 and the observation that informed buyers never play soft in
the low state, and informed sellers never play soft in the high state, τBL ≥ τBH and
τSH ≥ τSL. The second inequalities in (1) and (2) come from the observation that
an agent plays soft no more than k times, so the total mass of agents playing soft
is bounded above by (1 + δ + ... + δk), and the fraction of all agents playing soft is
bounded above by (1− δ).
To show (3), recall that in the low state only uninformed buyers would play
soft, so the total mass of buyers playing soft in the low state is bounded above by
(1− α)(1 + δ + ...+ δk). Then, the fraction of buyers playing tough in the low state
is τBL ≥ 1− (1− α)(1− δk). (4) is proven analogously.
1.4 Results
1.4.1 Negative Result
In this section, I show that for a fixed k, uninformed agents cannot learn the state
with certainty before trading, and as a result of this, the market cannot be efficient.
Theorem 2 (No percolation). For any sequence of games indexed i and parameterized
by
{(δi, k, α, vH , vL, pM , cH , cL)}∞i=1, with δi → 1, and corresponding equilibria for which
the limits of di and xi exist, at least one of the following must be true:
1. lim
i→∞
di < 1.
2. lim
i→∞
xi > 0.
This result states that even as the main friction disappears, either not all the
gains from trade will be realized (d < 1), or a significant fraction of agents will trade
at the wrong prices and have ex post regret (x > 0). This result is analogous to the
main results of Wolinsky (1990) and Blouin and Serrano (2001). The proof is similar
to the proofs in those works, but made simpler here by the additional possibility of
meeting agents who have already traded k times who will always play tough.
The main intuition of the proof regards the length of time an uninformed agent
waits before playing soft for the first time. I show that either the length of time
is too large, and the agent risks exiting before trading, even as the main friction
disappears, or the length of time is too short, and the agent will almost certainly
receive the same signal in both states before trading for the first time, and so will
almost certainly trade at the wrong price in one of the states.
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Proof of Theorem 2.
Step 0: Notation.
Let β
B
: N × N → Θ be a function in an equilibrium mapping from the total
number of sellers a buyer has met, and the number of times an uninformed buyer
has encountered a seller playing soft to a current belief. This is recursively defined:
β
B
(0, 0) = 1
2
, and for n, u > 0, β
B
(n, u) = βB(T, β
B
(n− 1, u)) = βB(S, βB(n− 1, u−
1)).
I then define m−1 as the minimum number of periods an uninformed buyer waits
before playing soft with positive probability in an equilibrium. For example, m = 1 if
an uninformed buyer waits no periods and plays soft in the first period with positive
probability, and m =∞ if no uninformed buyer ever plays soft. Then m is defined:
m = inf
mˆ,u,y
{mˆ|σB(y, βB(mˆ, u)) > 0}.
The proof proceeds in two cases. First, the case in which there is a subsequence
of equilibria with τSLi = τ
SH
i , and second, the case in which, for i sufficiently high,
τSLi < τ
SH
i . From Lemma 5, in each equilibrium, τ
SL
i ≤ τSHi so these cases are
exhaustive. In each of these cases, I will show that either lim
i→∞
di < 1 or lim
i→∞
xi > 0.
Step 1: If there is a subsequence of equilibria {i′} with τSHi′ = τSLi′ , then
lim
i′→∞
di′ < 1 or lim
i′→∞
xi′ > 0.
If in an equilibrium i′, τSHi′ = τ
SL
i′ , then uninformed buyers cannot learn, so for
any i′ in the subsequence, βBi′ (T,
1
2
) = βBi′ (S,
1
2
) = 1
2
. Then from [1.8], for all y and n:
Bi′(L,y,
1
2
, n) = Bi′(H,y,
1
2
, n).
If lim
i′→∞
dHi′ = 1 then almost all uninformed buyers play soft almost ki′ times in
both states before exiting, and lim
i′→∞
xLi′ > 0.
Step 2: If, for i sufficiently high τSLi < τ
SH
i , then lim
i′→∞
di′ < 1 or lim
i′→∞
xi′ > 0.
I now restrict attention to i sufficiently high. In this case, for θ ∈ (0, 1), from [1.7],
βBi (T, θ) > θ. Consider the sequence of {mi}. When mi is finite, a buyer who has
played tough and only encountered sellers playing tough for mi periods, must strictly
prefer playing soft in the next period, from Lemma 1 and Lemma 2. Then there are
two subcases.
Step 2, subcase 1: There is a subsequence of equilibria indexed i′ where
mi′ is infinite or lim
i′→∞
(δi′)
m′i < 1.
Along the subsequence {i′}, for i′ sufficiently large, from the definition of m, at
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least (1− lim
i′→∞
(δi′)
m′i)/2 > 0 of all uninformed buyers will exit before ever playing soft
in both states. If di′ → 1, then for i′ sufficiently large, di′ > 1−(1− lim
i′→∞
(δi′)
m′i)/4, and
in the high state, at least half of these buyers who do not play soft in the high state
must encounter at least one seller playing soft (to realize their gains from trade), so at
least (1− lim
i′→∞
(δi′)
m′i)/4 > 0 of all sellers will play soft at least once, and lim
i′→∞
xi′ > 0.
Step 2, subcase 2: lim
i→∞
(δi)
mi = 1.
In this subcase, almost all uninformed buyers survive mi periods after entering,
and so, for some histories, play soft. Consider a buyer’s meetings and actions over
these mi periods. If a buyer only plays tough and only encounters sellers playing
tough, from Lemma 2 and Lemma 1, he will play soft in his mth period. From
Lemma 5, τSLi ≥ (δi)k, so the proportion of buyers who encounter only sellers playing
tough for mi periods in the high state is:
(τSLi )
mi ≥ ((δi)k)mi = ((δi)mi)k. (1.15)
If (δi)
mi → 1 then (fSi )mi → 1, and in an equilibrium in the low state at least
(δi)
mi(τSLi )
mi → 1 of uninformed buyers will survive mi periods encountering sellers
only playing tough, and play soft at least once. If all uninformed buyers play soft at
least once in the low state, lim
i→∞
xi ≥ (1 − α)/k. Thus in both cases, τSLi < τSHi or
τSLi = τ
SH
i , either lim
i→∞
xi > 0 or lim
i→∞
di < 1.
1.4.1.1 Relationship to Prior Work
This impossibility result is related to the results of Wolinsky (1990) and Blouin
and Serrano (2001), both of which show that some trades will happen at the wrong
price. There are three significant differences between those earlier models and the
model presented here. The first two differences are in exiting and discounting. In
those models, agents only exit through trade, and discount future payoffs explicitly.
Here exit is exogenous (to prevent buyers and sellers from becoming unbalanced), and
is the source of discounting. Exogenous exit also introduces an additional friction not
seen in the earlier models; as agents leave less often it becomes more difficult to meet
an agent who has not traded k times. This additional friction makes the negative
proof in my model easier, as seen in [1.15], where buyers have difficulty meeting sellers
with units left to trade during their lifetime. As a result, this proof would not work
in earlier models, although the intuition is the same.
On the other hand, an assumption on the values, costs, and likelihoods of states
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called no fear by Blouin and Serrano is no longer required. This assumption is present
in both of those earlier models and guarantees that uninformed buyers or sellers would
be willing to play soft without learning. Finally, by allowing for multi-unit trade, this
result is in one aspect more general than earlier results. A discussion comparing the
assumptions is found in Section 1.4.3.1.
1.4.2 Positive Result
If instead of holding k fixed, buyers and sellers make a ‘large’ number of trades,
information percolation and efficiency can be achieved. In this section, I add a restric-
tion on payoffs, show how informed agents playing soft provides a signal from which
the uninformed can learn, show that this signal is informative enough, and finally
show that information percolation and efficiency will be achieved. Lastly I remove
the assumption on payoffs and show that information percolation is still possible,
although not guaranteed.
The following assumption on the shape of the payoffs, and implicitly the prices,
limits incentives to playing tough and hoping to meet an uninformed agent incorrectly
playing soft, when there is a guaranteed payoff to playing soft.
Assumption 1 (Restriction on payoffs).
vH − pL < (vH − pH)e1/(1−α) and pH − cL < (pL − cL)e1/(1−α). (1.16)
Recall that pH = cH and vL = pL. The necessity of this assumption is discussed in
Section 1.4.3.1.
1.4.2.1 Informed Agents Reveal Information:
Lemma 6 (Informed do not always misrepresent the state). Let (α, vH , vL, cH , cL) sat-
isfy Assumption 1. For any sequence of games parameterized by {(δi, ki, α, vH , vL, pM , cH , cL)}∞i=1
with (δi)
ki → 1 and ki → ∞, and corresponding equilibria indexed i, there exists a
proportion s ∈ (0, 1) such that for i sufficiently large, for all yi such that yi < ski
σBi (yi, 1) = 1 and for any zi such that zi < ski, σ
S
i (zi, 0) = 1
The purpose of this lemma is to lower bound the informativeness of match part-
ners’ actions for an uninformed agent trying to learn the state. Because a constant
fraction α of the agents in an economy is informed, and a significant fraction of agents
in any equilibrium and state will play tough, this fraction of informed playing soft in
one state and not the other can be sufficient for learning. Although the fraction of
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agents playing soft in a period approaches zero as frictions disappear, a later lemma
will show that the informativeness of this fraction is sufficient for positive results.
The proof strategy is to bound the payoff of an informed seller in the low state to
playing tough forever. If a seller has traded fewer than k times and knows the state
is low, she can guarantee a positive payoff by playing soft, or can hope to wait for
an uninformed buyer playing soft. As δk grows, the likelihood a seller can make a
significant mass of trades at a high price in the low state becomes upper bounded,
because she can only make these trades with uninformed buyers who have traded
fewer than k times. This upper bound is used to show that a seller will make a
positive fraction of her trades in the low state at a low price.
Proof. I will show that informed sellers in the low state play soft for at least bskic
periods.
Step 1: Notation.
Let 1−s′ = (1−α) ln[pH−cL
pL−cL ], so
pH−cL
pL−cL = [e
1/(1−α)](1−s
′). This will be the maximum
fraction of trades for which an informed agent plays tough. Pick κ > 0 to satisfy
(1 + κ)(1− s′) < 1, and let s = s′ − κ+ κs′, so (1− s) = (1− s′)(1 + κ).
Consider an informed seller who has traded (bskic − 1) times. From Lemma 2,
she may do one of the following:
1. Play soft for the next trade, then play tough indefinitely for expected value V 1.
2. Play tough for the remaining trades for expected value V 2.
To show that the informed seller will not do (2) for i sufficiently large, I will
compare the expected payoffs of V1 and V2. The payoff to (1) is: V 1 = τBL(pL −
cL) + (1− τBL)(pM − cL) + δiXi, where Xi is the payoff to playing tough indefinitely
for the remaining d(1 − s)kie trades, and the payoff to (2) is V 2 = Xi + ρiγi, Xi for
the first d(1− s)kie trades, plus γi, the expected payoff for the last trade, conditional
on making those trades, with ρi as the probability of making those trades.
Step 2: lim sup
i→∞
ρi ≤
(
pL − cL
pH − cL
)1+κ
.
The probability of a buyer making one trade in the high state then surviving while
playing tough is
δi(1−gBi )
(1−δi)+δi(1−τBLi )
, so the probability ρi of not exiting while waiting for
those trades d(1− s)kie to complete is:
ρi =
[
δi(1− τBLi )
(1− δi) + δi(1− τBLi )
]d(1−s)kie
≤
[
(1− α)(1− (δi)ki)
(1− δi) + (1− α)(1− (δi)ki)
]d(1−s)kie
(1.17)
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because (1 − τBLi ) ≤ (1 − α)(1 − (δi)ki) from Lemma 5. Simplifying the right hand
side of 1.17, this equals:[
(1− α)(1 + δi + ...+ (δi)ki−1)
1 + (1− α)(1 + δi + ...+ (δi)ki−1)
]d(1−s)kie
≤
[
(1− α)ki
1 + (1− α)ki
](1−s)ki
. (1.18)
This is rewritten, and then along the limit of ki →∞, this is an exponential:[
1− 1
1 + (1− α)ki
](1−s)ki
→
[
1− 1
(1− α)ki
]ki(1−s)
→ e− 1−s1−α . (1.19)
At this point the definition of (1− s) is used, so that probability becomes:
e−
(1−s′)(1+κ)
1−α = e
(1+κ) ln
(
pL−cL
pH−cL
)
=
(
pL − cL
pH − cL
)1+κ
. (1.20)
Thus lim sup
i→∞
ρi ≤
(
pL − cL
pH − cL
)1+κ
.
Step 3: V 1 > V 2.
I can then compare the difference in payoffs between (1) and (2):
V 1−V 2 ≥ τBL(pL−cL)+(1−τBL)(pM−cL)+δiXi-[Xi+ρiγi] ≥ pL−cL+δiXi-[Xi+ρiγi].
Along the limit of (δi)
ki → 1, and noting that Xi ≤ (pH − cL)(1 + δi + ... + (δi)dskie)
and γi ≤ pH − cL, we can bound the difference:
V 1− V 2 ≥ pL − cL − (1− δi)(1 + δi + ...+ (δi)ki−1)(pH − cL)− (pH − cL)ρi
= pL − cL − (pH − cL)ρi − (1− (δi)ki)(pH − cL). (1.21)
Using lim(δi)
ki = 1, and lim supρ ≤
(
pL−cL
pH−cH
)(1+κ)
, the right hand side of 1.21 is lower
bounded:
→ (pL − cL)
[
1−
(
pL − cL
pH − cL
)κ]
> 0. (1.22)
From 1.22, the payoff to playing tough forever (V 2) must be strictly below the
payoff to playing soft now then tough forever (V 1) for i sufficiently high. Thus for i
sufficiently large an informed seller will play soft after having traded bski − 1c units,
so by Lemma 2 an informed seller in the low state will play soft for the first bskic
periods. The proof for buyers is identical.
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1.4.2.2 Agents Learn
The next lemma is the last step necessary to show that information percolates.
Recall that β˜B : W × N → R is a function mapping the state and number of peri-
ods in the market to a random variable for beliefs in an equilibrium. For example,
Pr{β˜B(H, 1) = βB(T, 1
2
)} = τSH , and Pr{β˜B(H, 1) = βB(S, 1
2
)} = 1− τSH .
Lemma 7 (Agents learn). Consider any sequence of games {(δi, ki, α, vH , vL, pM , cH , cL)}∞i=1
and corresponding equilibria indexed i with lim
i→∞
(δi)
ki = 1. Suppose ∃s ∈ (0, 1] such
that informed buyers play soft in the high state and informed sellers play soft in the
low state immediately on entering for the first bskic periods.
Then there exists a sequence {ni}∞i=1 such that lim
i→∞
(δi)
ni = 1 and for n′i ≥ ni:
1. plim
i→∞
β˜Bi (L, n
′
i) = 0,
2. plim
i→∞
β˜Bi (H,n
′
i) = 1,
3. plim
i→∞
β˜Si (L, n
′
i) = 0, and
4. plim
i→∞
β˜Si (H,n
′
i) = 1.
In other words, information percolates.
The strategy of the proof is to use Lemma 6 which states that some informed
agents will play soft, and show that the number of times they play soft is enough, far
along the sequence of equilibria, for the uninformed agents to learn the state. It is
worthwhile to note the likelihood of encountering any agent playing soft in a period
converges to zero, but the number of softs a buyer expects to encounter over his life
grows to infinity with k.
Proof. Let
ni =
ln(1− 1√
ki
)
ln(δi)
. (1.23)
This will be the length of the learning period. From (1.23), (δi)
ni = (1 − 1√
ki
) → 1,
and buyers will survive the learning phase.
Step 1: For i sufficiently large, ∃b ∈ (0, 1) such that τSH − τSL < b(1− (δi)ki .
In the low state, from Lemma 6, an informed seller plays soft for at least bskic
periods, and from S and σS, there is a mass of α(1 + δi + ...+ δ
ski−1
i ) sellers playing
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soft that would not play soft in the high state. The probability of meeting one of
these sellers in any period is then:
α(1 + δi + ...+ (δi)
ski−1)/
(
1
1− δi
)
= α(1− (δi)ski). (1.24)
Using Lemma 4, which states that the fraction of uninformed sellers playing soft is
more in the low state than in the high state, and combining those uninformed sellers
and the informed sellers from (1.24):
τSLi ≤ τSHi − α(1− (δi)ski). (1.25)
From 1.25, ∃b > 0, such that this difference is lower bounded: α(1 − (δi)ski) >
b(1 − (δi)ki ), so we can bound the fraction of sellers playing soft correctly in the low
state:
1− (δi)ki ≥ 1− τSLi ≥ 1− τSHi + b(1− (δi)ki) > 0.
This demonstrates the difference between sellers playing soft in the low state
(1− τSLi ) and the high state (1− τSHi ). This difference approaches zero, but will be
large enough for buyers to learn the state.
Step 2: For any n′i ≥ n′i, plim βBi (L, n′i)→ 0 and plim βBi (H,n′i)→ 1.
Over these n′i periods let us consider how many times a buyer will encounter a seller
playing soft, conditional on the state being low. In expectation this is n′i(1 − τSLi ).
The number of times a buyer expects to encounter a seller playing soft, conditional
on the state being high, is n′i(1− τSHi ). Comparing these two, a buyer takes n′i draws
from a Bernoulli distribution, with success probability rLi = (1 − τSLi ) if the state is
low, and success probability rHi = (1 − τSHi ) if the state is high. If the buyer can
determine the state based on these draws, the buyer will learn the state.
Let Rwi be two random variables, one for each state w ∈ {H,L}, which is the
number of softs a buyer sees during the learning phase of n′i periods in state w. For a
state, the random variable has mean E[Rwi ] = n
′
ir
w
i and variance (σ
w
i )
2 = n′ir
w
i (1−rwi ).
Consider the deviation from the mean. Using Chebyshev’s inequality this is:
P
(
|Rwi − n′irwi | < n′i
rHi − rLi
4
)
≥ 1− 1
κ2i
,
with
κiσ
w
i = n
′
i
rLi − rHi
4
so
1
κ2i
=
4(σwi )
2
(rLi − rHi )2
.
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Substituting, the inequality becomes:
P
(
|Rwi − n′irwi | < n′i
rHi − rLi
4
)
≥ 1− 16 r
w
i (1− rwi )
n′i(r
H
i − rLi )2
.
Because rwi ≤ (1− (δi)ki), and (rLi − rHi ) ≥ b(1− (δi)ki):
1− 16 r
w
i (1− rwi )
n′i(r
H
i − rLi )2
≥ 1− 16 (1− (δi)
ki)
n′ib2(1− (δi)ki)2
= 1− 16 ln δi
ln(1− 1√
ki
)b2(1− (δi)ki) .
Along the limit of i→∞:
= 1− 16
b2
lim
i→∞
[
ln δi
1− δi
]
lim
i→∞
[
1
ln(1− 1√
ki
)(1 + δi + ...+ (δi)ki−1)
]
. (1.26)
The second limit can be evaluated using ki →∞ and (δi)ki → 1 to become
lim
i→∞
k−1i
ln(1− 1√
k1
)
= lim
i→∞
−(ki)−2
(−1
2
(ki)−3/2)( 11− 1√
ki
)
= 0.
So
lim
i→∞
P
(
|Rwi − n′irwi | < ni
rHi − rLi
4
)
= 1.
Thus, conditional on the state and making n′i observations, R
w
i will be at most
n′i
rHi −rLi
4
from n′ir
w
i . Since these are two disjoint ranges, conditional on surviving n
′
i
periods,
β˜Bi (H,n
′
i)
p→ 1 and β˜Bi (L, n′i) p→ 0.
Combining this with the probability of surviving ni periods, plim
i→∞
(δi)
ni β˜Bi (H,ni) =
1 and plim
i→∞
(δi)
ni(1− β˜Bi (ni, L)) = 1. The proof for the seller is identical.
While learning and efficiency can occur, there is no guarantee that they will result
in a sequence of equilibria with disappearing frictions. The next theorem shows that
Assumption 1 is sufficient to guarantee an outcome in which agents learn is the only
outcome as frictions disappear.
Theorem 3 (Positive Result). Let (α, vH , vL, cH , cL) satisfy Assumption 1. For any
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sequence of games parameterized by {(δi, ki, α, vH , vL, pM , cH , cL)}∞i=1 with (δi)ki → 1
and ki →∞, and corresponding equilibria indexed i, the following are true:
1. Information percolates in the sequence of equilibria.
2. The sequence of equilibria is efficient.
Proof. Information percolation follows directly from Lemmas 6 and 7, and efficiency
follows from Lemma 3.
The importance of multi-unit supply and demand is visible in several places. Most
importantly, trading a large number of units enables learning as seen in the proof of
Lemma 7 in (1.26). In this equation a fixed k would prevent beliefs from converging
to 0 or 1, so the high state and low state would never be perfectly distinguishable.
This result shows that eliminating frictions, with an additional assumption, makes
learning efficiency not only possible but also the guaranteed outcome. In the next the-
orem I relax Assumption 1 to show that if frictions disappear, learning and efficiency
are still possible although not guaranteed.
Theorem 4 (Positive Result Exists Generally). For any sequence of games param-
eterized by {(δi, ki, α, vH , vL, pM , cH , cL)}∞i=1 with (δi)ki → 1 and ki → ∞, there is a
corresponding sequence of equilibria indexed i such that the following are true:
1. Information percolates in the sequence of equilibria.
2. The sequence of equilibria is efficient.
Proof. The proof is as follows. Pick an s ∈ (0, 1). I define a new game with the
only difference being that all informed buyers [sellers] in the high [low] state must
play soft ski times immediately after entering. I then apply the existence proof to
construct a steady state and equilibrium of this game, still restricting buyers and
sellers for their first ski trades. As in the proof of Theorem 3, because informed
agents play soft for a significant fraction of their trades, information will percolate
and the sequence of equilibria is efficient. It is left to show that for i sufficiently
large, equilibria in the constrained game are equilibria in the base game. To do this
let ρi =
(
δi(1−τSHi )
(1−δi)+δi(1−τSHi )
)(1−s)ki
. Notice that ρi is the probability that a buyer will
survive to make (1−s)ki trades at a low price in the high state. Because the sequence
is efficient, ρi will necessarily approach zero. At this point I focus on high values of
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i and relax the restriction on the games and equilibria for low i. The proof proceeds
identically to the proof of Lemma 6 and the remainder of Theorem 3.
1.4.3 Discussion of Assumptions
In this section I discuss the choice of assumptions used in the paper. I start
by looking at the assumption on the payoffs, then discuss multi-unit supply and
demand, and finally exogenous exit and the prices. Assumption 1 is sufficient to
guarantee information percolation. The following is an example of the necessity of
this assumption.
1.4.3.1 A Degenerate Equilibrium and the Shape of Payoffs
To demonstrate the importance of Assumption 1, consider the following game
parameters:
(vH = 40, pH = 39 = cH , vL = 30 = pL, cL = 1, α =
1
2
).
In this case v
H−pL
vH−pH = 10 > e
1/(1−α) ≈ 7.4.
Consider δ = 0.99, k = 8 and the following strategies: ∀y and θ, σB(y, θ) = 0,
and σS(z, θ) = 1 for θ ∈ [0, 29
38
], z < k. In this case τBH = τBL = 1, τSL = δk, τSH =
1− 1
2
(1− δk), and the sellers’ strategies are clearly optimal. From this, τSH ≈ 0.9614,
and the probability that a buyer can make all his trades at pL in the high state is
0.2458. In the high state, since each item bought at the low price yields a payoff of
10, relative to a payoff at the high price of 1, all buyers will always play tough, and
buyers’ strategies are optimal.
In the low state, the outcome is Pareto efficient (subject to the exit rate) and
there is no ex post regret (xL = 0), as the sellers each play soft k times. But, in the
high state, the outcome is inefficient, and there is significant ex post regret, as all
trades are made at the wrong price. Assumption 1 prevents this scenario by reducing
the incentive that informed buyers in the high state have to play tough.
The parametrized example is one in which v
H−pL
vH−pH ≥ e
1
1−α and 1
2
(pL− cL) + 1
2
(pL−
cH) ≥ 0. In this game there exists an equilibrium where uninformed sellers play soft,
and buyers always play tough. On the other hand, if
1
2
(pL − cL) + 1
2
(pL − cH) < 0 and v
H − pL
vH − pH ≥ e
1
1−α , (1.27)
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then uninformed sellers are unwilling to trade at their priors, and some informed
buyers must play soft when the state is H, allowing uninformed sellers to update their
beliefs appropriately. If informed buyers play soft in the high state, some sellers will
learn the state, reducing buyers’ payoffs to playing tough. As it is unclear exactly
what the necessary relationships are to guarantee percolation and efficiency, these
conditions warrant additional study.
While I use an assumption on the shape of the payoffs, I can forgo the no fear
assumption present in Blouin and Serrano (2001) and Wolinsky (1990), which roughly
states that some uninformed agents do not need to learn to want to trade. In some
ways this assumption is restrictive, as the world is replete with markets where agents
learn before participating, and would not participate without learning. An example
of this would be a game partially parameterized by vH = 12, cH = 11, vL = 2, cL = 1.
In this case the results of earlier work do not apply, while the model presented in
this paper requires α ≥ 0.566 for the positive result to be the unique outcome in an
almost frictionless game.
Through Assumption 1, we see that not only are informed agents the source of
information and learning for uninformed agents, but the informed agents can also act
as a significant source of friction which discourages other informed agents from trying
to trade at prices at which an informed agent would not trade.
1.4.3.2 Multi-unit Supply and Demand
The assumption of multi-unit demand is critical to the positive information per-
colation and efficiency results. The assumption has two features worth noting. First,
agents can only trade zero or one units in a transaction. Second, marginal values and
costs are flat with a single jump. More general assumptions allow agents to trade
multiple goods in a single transaction, and give agents more flexible utility func-
tions. Allowing agents to trade multiple units in a single transaction gives agents the
opportunity to make all their trades at once, behaving like a single-unit consumer.
Allowing them to trade more than one unit at once, up to a limit, creates a more
complex model. In a model in which agents simultaneously decide the maximum units
to trade at the same time that they simultaneously pick prices, the possibility result
in Theorem 4 may still exist, although the uniqueness of the outcome in 3 would not.
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1.4.3.3 Exogenous Exit
Under exogenous exit, agents do not have a choice of when to exit. If the assump-
tion were changed, and buyers and sellers could choose to exit, or exit when they have
finished trading, then either the mass of buyers can differ from the mass of sellers,
or feasibility will be violated. If the mass of buyers differs from the mass of sellers,
then during matching some agents would be without a partner, raising complications.
If feasibility is violated, the total gains from trade available in a game would be a
function of the equilibrium. Either of these properties is highly undesirable, and for
these reasons I use the assumption of exogenous exit.
1.5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper I have presented a framework for understanding information per-
colation when buyers and sellers want to trade multiple goods. I first compared my
model to earlier models of dynamic matching and bargaining, and demonstrated a no-
percolation result analogous to the negative results of Wolinsky (1990) and Blouin and
Serrano (2001). Then, with an additional assumption to eliminate trivial equilibria in
which beliefs could never change, I showed that as the frictions of exit and granularity
of trades disappear, information would fully percolate in all equilibria, yielding the
efficiency and no ex post regret that would be found in an analogous market with
complete information. I also demonstrated that this outcome could realize without
the additional assumption on payoffs if frictions disappeared.
In order to show these results, several new assumptions were required. Allowing
buyers and sellers to trade multiple times introduced complications absent from earlier
work. In particular, using the standard assumption that agents exit if they have
completed trading may yield a different number of buyers and sellers even if their entry
rates are equal. Future work may further address the question of what conditions can
lead to or preclude information percolation. The evidence presented in this paper
suggests that if meetings are bilateral, and information is only transmitted through
prices, multiple transactions are required for information to fully percolate.
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1.6 Appendix
1.6.1 Proof of Lemma 1: Strategies Involve Threshold Beliefs
Proof. Recall the forward looking value functions vB and vB, which describe the value
of future participation in the market. For θ ∈ Θ and j < k, the value a buyer expects
for playing soft is described by:
vB(S, j, θ) =vL + θ(vH − vL)
− τSLpH − (1− τSL)pM − θ(τSH − τSL)pH + θ(τSH − τSL)pM
+ δτSLvB(j − 1, βB(T, θ)) + δθ(τSH − τSL)vB(j − 1, βB(T, θ))
+ δ(1− τSL)vB(j − 1, βB(S, θ))− θ(τSH − τSL)vB(j − 1, βB(S, θ)).
The value to playing tough is:
vB(T, j, θ) =θ(1− τSH)(vH − pL)
+ δ(θτSH + (1− θ)τSL)vB(j, βB(T, θ))
+ δ(θ(1− τSH) + (1− θ)(1− τSL)vB(j − 1, βB(S, θ)).
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From the value functions, the difference in values is:
vB(S, j, θ)− vB(T, j, θ) =θτSH(vH − vL) + vL (1.28)
− τSLpH − (1− τSL)pM − θ(τSH − τSL)(pH − pM)
− δ(τSHθ + (1− θ)τSL)(vB(y, βB(T, θ))− vB(y − 1, βB(T, θ))).
Step 1: If τSL > τSH then vB(S, j, θ)− vB(T, j, θ) is increasing in θ.
With some abuse of notation, I will use several derivatives. These derivatives exist
almost everywhere, except at points where vB(S, j, θ) = vB(T, j, θ). Furthermore,
even if the derivatives do not exist, the functions are still continuous.
The derivative of (1.28) is:
d(vB(S, j, θ)− vB(T, j, θ))
dθ
=
τSH(vH − vL)− (τSH − τSL)(pH − pM )
− δ(τSHθ + (1− θ)τSL)dβ
B(T, θ)
dθ
(
d(vB(j, βB(T, θ))− vB(j − 1, βB(T, θ)))
dβB(T, θ)
)
− δ(τSH − τSL)(vB(j, βB(T, θ))− vB(j − 1, βB(T, θ))).
From consistency of beliefs in (1.7), dβ
B(T,θ)
dθ
= τ
SHτSL
(θτSH+(1−θ)τSL)2 . Because
τSH < τSL, τ
SHτSL
(θτSH+(1−θ)τSL)2 <
τSH
(θτSH+(1−θ)τSL) for θ ∈ (0, 1).
From Property (V5), the value of the marginal good can be upper bounded:(
d(vB(j, βB(T, θ))− vB(j − 1, βB(T, θ)))
dβB(T, θ)
)
≤ (vH − vL).
Then a new lower bound on the derivative of the difference in values is:
d(vB(S, j, θ)− vB(T, j, θ))
dθ
≥
τSH(vH − vL)− (τSH − τSL)(pH − pM )
− δ(τSHθ + (1− θ)τSL) τ
SH
(θτSH + (1− θ)τSL) (v
H − vL)
+ δ(τSL − τSH)(vB(j, βB(T, θ))− vB(j − 1, βB(T, θ))).
= (1− δ) (τSH(vH − vL))+ (τSL − τSH)(pH − pM )
+ δ(τSL − τSH)(vB(j, βB(T, θ))− vB(j − 1, βB(T, θ))).
> 0.
Because the derivative is strictly greater than zero, vB(S, j, θ) − vB(T, j, θ) is
increasing in θ.
Step 2: If τSL < τSH then vB(S, j, θ)−vB(T, j, θ) is increasing in θ by induction.
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Let j = argmin
y,θ
{σB(y, θ) > 0}, so j is the fewest number of goods a buyer has
where he, for some belief, plays soft. For example, if j = 2, then a buyer who has
traded k − 1 times will not play soft for any belief, but for some θ, vB(S, j, θ) ≥
vB(T, j, θ). This is the base case of the induction.
If j = 1, then whenever buyers have one unit left to buy, they may play soft for
some belief. If j > 1, after trading in the base case and having j − 1 units left, they
will play tough forever. Using the martingale property of beliefs, the remaining value
on having j − 1 units left to trade or fewer is:
vB(j, θ) = θ
(
vH − pL + δvB(j − 1, θ)) 1− τSH
1− δτSH for 0 < j < j.
With vB(0, θ) = 0, I unravel the recursion:
vB(j − 1, θ) = θ
j−1∑
i=1
(δ)i−1
(
(1− τSH)
1− δτSH
)i
(vH − pL).
When an agent has j units left to trade and a belief θ, he must decide how many
times t to play tough before playing soft, t ∈ {∞, 0, 1, ...}. Let vm : N× N×Θ→ R
be the value function of a buyer mapping a number j units left to buy, a number t
periods to wait before playing soft, and a belief θ to a payoff.
Then the payoff to waiting t times is:
vm(j, t, θ) =θ
[
((τSHδ)t)
vH − τSHpH − (1− τSH)pL + δ j−1∑
i=1
(δ)i−1
(
(1− τSH)
1− δτSH
)i
(vH − pL)
 (1.29)
+ (1− τSH)(1 + τSHδ + ...+ (τSHδ)t−1)
vH − pL + δ j−1∑
i=1
(δ)i−1
(
(1− τSH)
1− δτSH
)i
(vH − pL)
]
+ (1− θ)((τSLδ)t)(vL − τSLpH − (1− τSL)pL).
Then v(j, θ) = max
t∈N
vm(j, t, θ), since an agent will optimally wait to play soft.
By inspection, for each t, vm(j, t, θ) is linear in θ, so dvm(j,t,θ)
dθ
exists and is constant
for every t. Moreover, for θ = 0, playing soft is strictly dominated, and
vm(j, 0, 0) < vm(j, 1, 0) < ... < vm(j,∞, 0).
Finally, by the value function property (V1), since for some θ, vB(S, j, θ) > vB(T, j, θ),
replacing vB(T, j, θ) with any vm(j, t, θ), with t ≥ 1, we find dvB(S,j,θ)
dθ
> dv
B(T,j,θ)
dθ
.
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Since dv
B(S,j,θ)
dθ
> dv
B(T,j,θ)
dθ
, dv
B(S,j,θ)
dθ
− dvB(T,j,θ)
dθ
> 0, and:
d(vB(S, j, θ)− vB(T, j, θ))
dθ
= (1.30)
τSH(vH − vL)− (τSH − τSL)(pH − pM )
− δ(τSHθ + (1− θ)f)dβ
B(T, θ)
dθ
(
d(vB(j, βB(T, θ))− vB(j − 1, βB(T, θ)))
dβB(T, θ)
)
− δ(τSH − τSL)(vB(j, βB(T, θ))− vB(j − 1, βB(T, θ)))
> 0.
The Inductive Step:
Recall from Property (V4) that for any θ, for j′ > j > 0, if τSL 6= τSH , then:
vB(j, θ)− vB(j − 1, θ) > vB(j′, θ)− vB(j′ − 1, θ),
and Property (V5), which is restated, if βB(T, θ) > θ, then:
v(j, βB(T, θ))− v(j, θ) > v(j′, βB(T, θ))− v(j′, θ).
Using these two properties, and since τSH > τSL, βB(T, θ) > θ, and for any j > j,
d(vB(S, j, θ)− vB(T, j, θ))
dθ
= (1.31)
τSH(vH − vL)− (τSH − τSL)(pH − pM )
− δ(τSHθ + (1− θ)τSL)dβ
B(T, θ)
dθ
(
d(vB(j, βB(T, θ))− vB(j − 1, βB(T, θ)))
dβB(T, θ)
)
− δ(τSH − τSL)(vB(j, βB(T, θ))− vB(j − 1, βB(T, θ)))
>
τSH(vH − vL)− (τSH − τSL)(pH − pM ) (1.32)
− δ(τSHθ + (1− θ)τSL)dβ
B(T, θ)
dθ
(
d(vB(j − 1, βB(T, θ))− vB(j − 2, βB(T, θ)))
dβB(T, θ)
)
− δ(τSH − τSL)(vB(j − 1, βB(T, θ))− vB(j − 2, βB(T, θ)))
> 0
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then
τSH(vH − vL)− (τSH − τSL)(pH − pM ) (1.33)
> δ(τSHθ + (1− θ)τSL)dβ
B(T, θ)
dθ
(
d(vB(j, βB(T, θ))− vB(j − 1, βB(T, θ)))
dβB(T, θ)
)
+ δ(τSH − τSL)(vB(j, βB(T, θ))− vB(j − 1, βB(T, θ)))
> 0.
Although this difference in derivatives may be set valued, it is always positive whenever
a buyer might play soft for some belief and set past of trades.
In both the case in which τSL > τSH and the case in which τSL < τSH the claim is
true. If τSL = τSH , then βB(T, θ) = θ, and the proof is trivial. The proof for sellers is
symmetric and omitted.
1.6.2 Proof of Lemma 2: Agents Play Soft First
Proof. For a buyer, recall the forward looking value functions, which describe the
value of future participation in the market. For θ ∈ Θ and j < k, the value for
playing soft is described by:
vB(S, j, θ) =vL + θ(vH − vL)
− τSLpH − (1− τSL)pM − θ(τSH − τSL)pH + θ(τSH − τSL)pM
+ δτSLvB(j − 1, βB(T, θ)) + δθ(τSH − τSL)vB(j − 1, βB(T, θ))
+ δ(1− τSL)vB(j − 1, βB(S, θ))− θ(τSH − τSL)vB(j − 1, βB(S, θ)),
and the value to playing tough is:
vB(T, j, θ) =θ(1− τSH)(vH − pL)
+ δ(θτSH + (1− θ)τSL)vB(j, βB(T, θ))
+ δ(θ(1− τSH) + (1− θ)(1− τSL)vB(j − 1, βB(S, θ)).
And the difference in values is:
vB(S, j, θ)− vB(T, j, θ) =θτSH(vH − vL) + vL (1.34)
− τSLpH − (1− τSL)pM − θ(τSH − τSL)(pH − pM)
− δ(τSHθ + (1− θ)τSL)(vB(j, βB(T, θ))− vB(j − 1, βB(T, θ))).
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Only the third line of the right hand side of (1.34) depends on the number of units
left to trade, and for j′ > j from (V4), if τSL 6= τSH then vB(S, j′, θ)− vB(T, j′, θ) >
vB(S, j, θ)− vB(T, j, θ). For an informed buyer (a buyer for whom θ ∈ {0, 1}), Prop-
erty (V1) applies. The proof for sellers is identical and omitted.
1.6.3 Proof of Equilibrium Existence
Step 1: The isomorphic game and strategies.
The strategies for the buyer and seller are broken into 6 strategies of interest. Let
K = {0, 1, ..., k − 1}. Let m ∈ K represent either the number of softs played by a
trading partner, or the number of times traded. If an agent has traded k or more
times, he or she will play tough. For this reason I restrict agents to doing this, and
only examine the strategic considerations of agents who have traded fewer than k
times. A strategy σ˜ : K × K → [0, 1] maps the number of softs seen and the total
number of units traded to the likelihood of playing soft before exiting, conditional on
only encountering trading partners playing tough. Let Ω be the space of strategies
of this type. σ˜ ∈ {σ˜BH , σ˜BL, σ˜UB, σ˜SH , σ˜SL, σ˜US}, for an informed buyer in the high
state, an informed buyer in the low state, an uninformed buyer, and also three for
the sellers.
A strategy dictates the one or two periods in which an agent plays soft. For
example, if δ = 0.9 and σ˜UB(0, 0) = 0.81, then an uninformed buyer who, after
entry, encounters two sellers playing tough in sequence, will play soft in the third
period. If the buyer encounters one seller playing soft, and has traded two units,
then σ˜UB(2, 1) tells us when the buyer will play soft to trade a third unit, if ever. If
σ˜UB(0, 0) = 0.80, then a buyer will play soft after the second period with probability
p such that p0.81 + (1− p)0.729 = 0.80. Then the buyer’s likelihood of exiting before
playing soft is 0.80. For any y, u, given σ(y, u), I denote the probability of playing
soft in a period n as p = min(max( σ−δ
n+1
δt−δn+1 , 0), 1).
To simplify notation let σ : {BH,BL,UB, SH, SL, US} × N3 → [0, 1] map an
agent’s history to a likelihood of playing soft, so σ(BH, y, u, n) = min
(
max
(
σBH(y,u)−δn+1
δn−δn+1 , 0
)
, 1
)
.
Let Σ = [0, 1]6k
2
be the set of all strategy profiles.
Let the steady state statistics (τSL, τSH , τBH , τBL) take the same meaning as
earlier, and let Γ = [0, 1]4 be the set of all possible steady state statistics. I use the
forward looking value functions vB and vS as before, where vB is defined from vB
using τSH and τSL and vS is defined from vS using τBH and τBL.
The remainder of the proof is structured as follows: I construct a fixed point using
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strategy profiles and steady state statistics. Let F1 : Γ → 2Σ map a strategy profile
and steady state statistics to a new set of strategy profiles, and let F2 : Γ × Σ → Γ
map to a new set of steady state statistics. Let F = (F1, F2), so F : Γ×Σ→ 2Γ ×Σ
constitutes a self-mapping correspondence. As the domain of (F1, F2) is compact, I
then prove that F1 and F2 satisfy the closed graph property, and that for τ ∈ Γ and
σ ∈ Σ, F1(τ) and F2(σ) are non-empty and convex valued. Finally I prove that a
fixed point of (F1, F2) constitute an equilibrium of the original game.
Step 1, substep 1: F1 definition.
As in the negative proof, let β
S
, β
B
: N× N map an age and number of softs seen to
a belief, and that these functions are conditional on some τ ∈ Γ. Given σ ∈ Σ and
τ ∈ Γ,
F1(σ, τ) = (σ˜
BH , σ˜BL, σ˜UB, σ˜SH , σ˜SL, σ˜US). (1.35)
Let FUB1 (τ) represent σ˜
UB. To construct FUB1 (τ)(y, u) for any y, u, let J be the
set of all values n ≥ that satisfy the following two inequalities:
vB
(
T, k − y, βB(n, u)
)
≤ vB
(
S, k − y, βB(n, u)
)
(1.36)
and if n ≥ 1, vB
(
T, k − y, βB(n− 1, u)
)
≥ vB
(
S, k − y, βB(n− 1, u)
)
(1.37)
So J is the set of elements such that it is profitable to play soft, but in earlier
periods it was better to play tough. If J is empty, then let FUB1 (y,m) = 0, otherwise,
let
FUB1 (y,m) = [δ
min(J), δsup(J)]. (1.38)
Step 1, substep 2: F1(τ) is nonempty and convex valued, and F1 has the
closed graph property.
By construction, for any τ ∈ Γ, F1(τ) is non-empty and convex valued. To show
the closed graph property, take any pair of sequences τi → τ and qi → q such that
qi ∈ FUB1 (τi). Recall that for any y,m, vBi (T, k − y,m) and vBi (T, k − y,m), which
are defined in (1.4-1.6), are continuous in τi.
I will show the closed graph property by contradiction. Suppose that q > max(F1(τ)),
so according to q the buyer would wait at most j periods and the buyer following
max(F1(τ)) would wait at least j
′ periods, j′ > j. So for n = j, (1.36) does not
hold at τ . But for τi near τ , (1.36) will hold as qi ∈ FUB1 (τi). This contradicts the
continuity of vB.
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Next suppose q < min(FUB1 (τ)). Again consider j
′ corresponding to min(FUB1 (τ))
and j corresponding to q. Under τ then, at j′, (1.36) and (1.37) are satisfied, but
at j they are not. Again this is a violation of the continuity of vB. Since neither
q > max(F1(τ)) nor q < min(F1(τ)), q ∈ F1(τ).
Step 2, substep 1: F2 definition, continuity and existence.
I next construct two functions: conditional buyer and seller mass functions B˜ :
{0, 1, 1
2
} ×W × Σ× Γ× N× N2 → R and S˜ : {0, 1, 1
2
} ×W × Σ× Γ× N× N2 → R
which map to a mass of agents. The inputs to B˜ and S˜ are: an initial belief, the state
of nature w, strategy profile and steady state statistics, age n, and trading histories
which are characterized by total number of goods traded y and a total number of
trading partners playing soft, m.
Note that these mass functions are similar to the earlier mass functions, but take
τ as an input, and so are not linked, compared to the earlier mass functions in which
τ was determined endogenously. Then B˜ is defined for the high state as follows:
B˜(θ,H, σ, τ, n, y,m) = δτSHB˜(θ,H, τSH , n− 1, y,m)(1− σ(BH, y,m, n− 1)) + (1.39)
δτSHB˜(θ,H, τSH , n− 1, y − 1,m)σ(BH, y,m, n− 1)
+δ(1− τSH)B˜(θ,H, τSH , n− 1, y − 1,m− 1)
with bases cases of B˜(1
2
, H, σ, τ, 0, 0, 0) = B˜(1
2
, L, σ, τ, 0, 0, 0) = (1−α), B˜(1, H, σ, τ, 0, 0, 0) =
B˜(0, L, σ, τ, 0, 0, 0) = α, and B˜(1, L, σ, τ, 0, 0, 0) = B˜(0, H, σ, τ, 0, 0, 0) = 0. Note that
the last line of (1.39) omits the buyer’s action; once the buyer encounters a seller
playing soft the price (and so buyer’s action) is irrelevant. S˜ is analogously defined.
Based on those mass functions, I define F2 : Σ × Γ → τ which calculates the
fractions of agents in a given state playing tough. In the high state the fraction of
buyers playing tough is:
FBH2 (σ, τ) = (1− δ)
∑
n
∑
y
∑
m
B˜(
1
2
, H, τSH , n, y,m)(1− σ(UB, y,m, n)) (1.40)
+(1− δ)
∑
n
∑
y
∑
m
B˜(1, H, τSH , n, y,m)(1− σ(BH, y,m, n)).
FBL2 , F
SH
2 , F
SL
2 are analogously defined. The existence of F2(τ, σ) and the conti-
nuity of F2 come trivially from the definition.
Step 3: (F1, F2) has a fixed point.
Because the function (F1, F2) has the closed graph property and (F1, F2)(τ, σ) is
non-empty and convex, by Kakutani’s fixed point theorem it has a fixed point. From
this fixed point we can recover the 10-tuple constituting a steady state, this step is
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simple and omitted. Note that in this steady state, τBH ≤ τBL and τSH ≥ τSL.
Step 4: The fixed point is an equilibrium of the original game.
By construction, the steady state satisfies consistency of beliefs and stationarity. Fi-
nally we must check optimality. Recall that we restricted the buyers and sellers in
this game to waiting a number of periods before playing soft. As beliefs move mono-
tonically in the number of toughs encountered, from Lemma 1 (the single crossing
property for beliefs), if an agent does not play soft immediately but plays soft only
after encountering some number of toughs, he or she would be willing to play soft
after encountering more toughs. Thus the restriction we placed on constructing σ is
non-binding, and in constructing the steady state, σB and σS are optimal.
1.6.4 Proof of Lemma 3: Equivalence of Efficiency and Information Per-
colation
Proof.
Recall that xwi is the proportion of trades taking place at the ‘wrong’ price in
a state w and equilibrium i, and dwi is the fraction of gains to trade realized. Let
xH ≡ lim sup
i→∞
xHi , d
H ≡ lim inf
i→∞
dHi , with x
L and dL analogously defined.
Step 1: Information percolation implies xL = 0.
Suppose information percolates and xL > 0, and consider the subsequence {i′} where
lim
i′→∞
xLi′ = x
L.
In any equilibrium with index i′, let V Pi′ be the average normalized payoff of an
uninformed buyer in the high state, and V Ni′ be the average normalized payoff of an
uninformed buyer in the low state. Because we are interested in the payoff of agents
when exiting (after matching and bargaining), we cannot use the mass functions
directly, which measure populations before matching and bargaining. So we use
uninformed buyers at least one period old, of which there are a mass of
(
δi(1−α)
1−δi
)
from (1.9) to look at the payoffs of the uninformed buyers in both states:
V Pi′ =
( ∑
0<θ<1
∑
y
∑
n>0
Bi′(H,y, θ, n)(min(ki′ , y)v
H + max(0, y − ki′)vL − yHpH − yMpM − yLpL)
)
ki′
(
δi′ (1−α)
1−δi′
) ,
and
V Ni′ =
( ∑
0<θ<1
∑
y
∑
n>0
Bi′(L,y, θ, n)(yv
L − yHpH − yMpM − yLpL)
)
/
(
ki′
δi′(1− α)
1− δi′
)
.
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Then an uninformed buyer on entering in equilibrium i′ expects to receive:
V Bi′ ((0, 0, 0),
1
2
)
k
=
V Pi′
2
+
V Ni′
2
.
Note that V Ni′ is bounded below by (v
L − pH) and for i′ sufficiently large above
by xL(vL − pM). V Pi is bounded below by 0 and above by (vH − pL). Given these
bounds there must be a convergent subsequence of V Pi′ and V Ni′ . Throw out all
elements of this subsequence preventing it from converging, and let V N and V P be
the limits.
Let δ ∈ (0, 1) and  > 0 satisfy:
δ((1− δ)V N + δ2dHV P )−  > V N + V P,
which exists for δ close to 1 and  close to 0 because V N < 0 and V P > 0.
From information percolation let 1, 2 = (1−δ), so for i′′ > i′, δi′′ > δ, Pr{βˆB(L, ni′) <
(1− δ)} > δ and Pr{βˆB(H,ni′) > δ} > δ.
Take {ni′} such that from information percolation, for i′ sufficiently large, (δi′)ni′ >
δ, Pr{β˜Bi′ (H,ni′) > δ} > δ, and Pr{β˜Bi′ (L, ni′) < (1 − δ)} > δ. I then construct
a sequence of strategies σˆBi′ which yields a payoff in expectation exceeding δ((1 −
δ)V Ni′ + δ
2
V Pi′), by shifting all soft actions until after ni′ periods, and not trading
if after ni′ periods, his belief θ that the state is high is below δ. So Vˆ
B
i ((0, 0, 0),
1
2
) =
δ((1 − δ)V Pi
2
+ δ V Ni
2
) > V Bi ((0, 0, 0),
1
2
), and σBi′ is not optimal, so the assumption
xL > 0 must be false.
Step 2: Information percolation and xL = 0 implies dH = 1.
A buyer can make six types of trades: buyer ‘correct’ softs at a high price in the high
state, buyer ‘incorrect’ softs at a high price in the low state, seller ‘correct’ softs at
low price in the low state, seller ‘incorrect’ softs resulting in purchases at a medium
price in the high state, and buyer ‘incorrect’ softs resulting in a medium price in the
low state. Combining these for both informed and uninformed buyers, to bound the
expected payoff of an uninformed buyer, we get:
(1− α)V Bi ((0, 0, 0),
1
2
) + α
V Bi ((0, 0, 0), 0) + V
B
i ((0, 0, 0), 1)
2
(1.41)
≤ kixLi (vL − pM )/2 + kidHi (vH − pH)/2 + kixHi (pH − pL)/2.
Because an informed buyer can imitate an uninformed, an uninformed’s payoff is
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weakly less than the average buyer’s payoff, so
V Bi ((0, 0, 0),
1
2
) ≤ kixLi (vL − pM) + kidHi (vH − pH) + kixHi (pH − pL). (1.42)
Using information percolation, for any δ < 1, for i sufficiently large, the payoff of
an uniformed buyer is at least
V Bi ((0, 0, 0),
1
2
) ≥ (1− δ)ki(vL − pH)/2 + δki(vH − pH)/2, (1.43)
since an uninformed buyer can wait ni periods to learn the state with probability δ
and survive to play soft ki times. Combining (1.42) and (1.43), given δ and for i
sufficiently high:
xLi (v
L − pM)/2 + dHi (vH − pH)/2 + xHi (pH − pL)/2 (1.44)
≥ 1
ki
V Bi ((0, 0, 0),
1
2
) ≥ (1− δ)(vL − pH)/2 + δ(vH − pH)/2.
Since xi → 0, the upper bound of (1.44) becomes dHi (vH − pH)/2. The lower
bound also approaches (vH − pH)/2, so dHi → 1.
Step 3: Efficiency implies information percolation.
Suppose lim
i→∞
xi = 0 and lim
i→∞
di = 1, so the sequence is efficient. Let β
B
i : {T, S}×Θ→
Θ be the belief of an uninformed buyer given a set of past trades and time in the
market, so β
B
i (y, n) is the belief of an uninformed buyer who has met n trading
partners and has made the trades y. This is recursively defined using the earlier
belief update function:
β
B
i ((y
H , yM , yL), n) = βBi (T, β
B
i ((y
H , yM , yL), n−1)) = βBi (T, β
B
i ((y
H−1, yM , yL), n−1))
and
β
B
i ((y
H , yM , yL), n) = βBi (S, β
B
i ((y
H , yM−1, yL), n−1)) = βBi (S, β
B
i ((y
H , yM , yL−1), n−1))
with the base case at the prior: β
B
((0, 0, 0), 0) = 1
2
.
Take any 1 > 0. Consider an equilibrium, and let ni be the minimum number
of periods after which at least (1 − 1) of the uninformed buyers have played soft
for at least ki
2
periods in the high state. From di → 1 and the definition of d in
(1.12), (δi)
ni → 1. Let wi be the fraction of uninformed buyers who have played soft
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at least ki
2
times in state w after ni periods. From xi → 0, lim
i→∞
Li → 0, and from
the definition of 1, the limit of agents who have played soft at least
ki
2
times in the
high state converges to (1− ). Because beliefs are consistent, plim β˜i(H,ni) = 1 and
plim β˜i(L, ni) = 0. Thus information percolates.
1.6.5 Proof of Lemma 4: Uninformed do not Trade ‘Badly’
Recall that the lemma states( ∑
0<θ<1
∑
y
∑
n
B(H,y, θ, n)σB(y, θ)
)
≥
( ∑
0<θ<1
∑
y
∑
n
B(L,y, θ, n)σB(y, θ)
)
,
and ( ∑
0<θ<1
∑
y
∑
n
S(H,y, θ, n)σS(y, θ)
)
≤
( ∑
0<θ<1
∑
y
∑
n
S(L,y, θ, n)σS(y, θ)
)
.
Proof. To show how the mass of uninformed buyers playing soft differs between the
states, I will look at histories of these buyers.
Consider enumerating the number of periods buyers have been in the market,
and the actions of their trading partners over those periods. For the remainder
of this proof I will call the ordered list of seller actions a buyer has encountered
histories, h ∈ H. If a buyer has been in the market for n periods then there 2n
possible histories. For example, for n = 2 there are four histories, which I will denote
{(TT ), (TS), (ST ), (SS)}. Within and after each of these histories a buyer may play
soft a different number of times; we will focus on these number of softs.
Let e : H→ {T, S} be a function giving the last element of a history. Let h be the
subhistory of h with the last period removed. Let βH : H→ R be the belief function
for uninformed buyers mapping histories to beliefs. This is defined recursively with
βH(∅) = 12 . If h ∈ H/{∅} and e(h) = T , then βH(h) = β(T, βH(h)), and if h is a
history and e(h) = S, then βH(h) = β(S, βH(h)). The purpose of this belief function
is to use histories in equilibrium strategies.
Let λ : H× N3 → R be a mass function that tells the mass of uninformed buyers
in a state with a given history that have a given set of past trades at the end of
a period (after entry), conditional on that history. It is recursively defined, with
λ(∅, (0, 0, 0)) = 1. If h is a history and e(h) = T , and y consists of yM , yL, yH > 0,
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then:
λ(h,y) = λ(h, (yH − 1, yM , yL))σB((yH − 1, yM , yL), βH(h)) (1.45)
+λ(h,y)(1− σB(y, βH(h))),
and if e(H) = S then
λ(h,y) = λ(h, (yH , yM − 1, yL))σB((yH , yM − 1, yL), βH(h)) (1.46)
+λ(h, (yH , yM , yL − 1))(1− σB((yH , yM , yL − 1), βH(h))).
Then by construction
∑
y
λ(h,y) = 1.
Let h˜ : H→ 2H be a function that gives all subhistories of a history, for example
h˜(TTS) = {∅, (T ), (TT ), (TTS)}.
Let s : 2H → R be a function in an equilibrium mapping sets of histories to the
average number of softs a buyer will have played over the set. This is defined:
s(H) =
∑
h′∈H
∑
h′′∈h˜(h′)
∑
y∈N3
λ(h′′,y)σB(y, βH(h′′))
|H| . (1.47)
I will use s for sets of histories in which each history is equally likely. Let Hun
be the set of histories of length n that have u softs (and n − u toughs). Moving
from histories containing 0 softs to histories containing n softs is a sequence of sets of
histories: (H0n, ..., H
n
n ). Let ρ : W ×N×N be a function in an equilibrium that maps
from state, number of periods and number of softs to the probability that a buyer
encounters that many softs over that many periods.
For example, the probability of a history of n periods having u softs in the high
state, ρ(w, n, u) is defined:
ρ(H,n, u) =
n!
u!(n− u)!(τ
SH)(n−u)(1− τSH)u, (1.48)
and
ρ(L, n, u) =
n!
u!(n− u)!(τ
SL)(n−u)(1− τSL)u. (1.49)
The mass of buyers playing soft in state w is
( ∑
0<θ<1
∑
y
∑
n
B(w,y, θ, n)σB(y, θ)
)
.
The mass of softs that uninformed buyers of age n have played is then δn
n∑
u=0
s(Hnu )ρ(w, n, u).
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The mass played by uninformed buyers of age n in prior periods is then δn
n−1∑
u=0
s(Hn−1u )ρ(w, n−
1, u). Combining these two over all periods yields:
∑
0<θ<1
∑
y
∑
n
B(w,y, θ, n)σB(y, θ) = (1− α)
∞∑
n=0
n∑
u=0
ρ(w, n, u)s(Hnu )[δ
n − δn+1].
(1.50)
From (1.50) and (1.13), Lemma 4 is then satisfied for buyers if for all n:∑
u≤n
ρ(L, n, u)s(Hnu ) ≤
∑
u≤n
ρ(H, u, n)s(Hnu ). (1.51)
The proof proceeds in three cases. First the case in which τSH = τSL, and prices
are uninformative, then the case in which τSH > τSL, and encountering a seller
playing tough increases a buyer’s belief that the state is high, and finally τSH < τSL,
where only encountering a seller playing soft will increase a buyer’s belief that the
state is high. In all three cases I will show (1.51) holds true, in the latter two by
showing both ρ and s(Hnu ) move in the same direction to show (1.51).
Case 1: If τSH = τSL, then (1.51) is satisfied.
In this case, from (1.8), the steady state masses of uninformed buyers in the high
and low states are identical, so the fraction of uninformed buyers playing soft in the
high and low states is identical.
Case 2: If τSH > τSL, then (1.51) is satisfied.
This case consists of two steps, showing first that the probabilities ρ move mono-
tonically, and more softs are expected in the low state, then that seeing more toughs
leads the buyer play more softs. Intuitively, toughs are more commin in the high
state and buyers will play soft more if they encounter more toughs.
Case 2, step 1: for any n > 0, for all u ∈ {1, ..., n}, ρ(L,n,u)
ρ(L,n,u−1) >
ρ(H,n,u)
ρ(H,n,u−1) .
This follows directly from the definition of ρ and τSH > τSL. This is the first half
of showing (1.51).
Case 2, step 2: If τSH > τSL, then for each u ∈ {1, ..., n}, s(Hun) < s(Hu−1n ).
To show this I will pair each history h with (u−1) softs (h ∈ Hu−1n ) to a history h′
with u softs (h′ ∈ hun), and show that the average3 number of softs a buyer has played
after h is always weakly greater than average number of softs a buyer has played after
h′. Because the cardinalities of Hu−1n and H
u
n may differ, the pairing is defined as
3If we restricted attention to pure strategies then this average would be unnecessary.
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follows. For each h ∈ Hu−1n pair it with h′ ∈ Hun such that h and h′ differ in exactly
one period and s({h′}) is maximized. From all of these paired histories h′ construct
a set Hu
′
n . Because of the construction of H
u′
n , s(H
u′
n ) > s(H
u
n)
4.
To compare s(Hu
′
n ) and s(H
u−1
n ), take any two matched histories, h
′ with u and
h with u − 1 softs that differ in the tth position, and a deterministic buyer5. Let ht
and h′t be the subhistories after t periods of those histories. Let yt and y
′
t be the
sets of past trades of the buyer after ht and h
′
t. For t ≤ t, we know yt = y′t and
βH(ht) = βH(h
′
t). Let qt and q
′
t be the number of softs the buyer has played after ht
and h′t respectively.
Case 2, step 2, subcase 1: The buyer plays soft in period t.
In this case, yt = y
′
t
. Suppose in some period t, qt = q
′
t, and σ
B(y′, βH(h′)) = 1.
Then since yt = y
′
t
, and βH(ht) > βH(h
′
t), from Lemma 1, σ
B(y, βH(h)) = 1. Thus,
since qt = q
′
t
, and q′t never increases beyond qt, qt ≥ q′t. Finally qn = s(hn) and
q′n = s(h
′
n).
Case 2, step 2, subcase 2: The buyer plays tough in period t.
In this case the buyer encountering a seller playing tough in period t trades one
fewer unit than the buyer encountering a seller playing soft. Again qt = q
′
t
, but
y′
t
> yt. Suppose in some period t, ut = u
′
t, y
′
t > yt, and σ
B(y′t, βH(h
′)) = 1. Then
since y′t > yt, and βH(ht) > βH(h
′
t), from Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, σ
B(yt, βH(ht)) = 1.
Thus again q′t cannot increase beyond qt.
Since for every matched history, buyers encountering sellers playing soft u − 1
times will play soft at least as many times as buyers encountering sellers playing soft
u times, s(Hun) > s(H
u′
n ).
Case 3: If τSH > τSL, then (1.51) is satisfied.
I will prove this case in a way similar to the last case, and use Lemma 2 which
states that if σB(y, θ) > 0, then for y′ such that y′ < y, σB(y′, θ) = 0. Note that in
the high state encountering sellers playing soft is relatively more likely than in the
low state, so
∀u ∈ {1, ..., n}, ρ(L, n, u)− ρ(L, n, u− 1) > ρ(H,n, u)− ρ(H,n, u− 1). (1.52)
I pair histories exactly the same as I did for the case when τSL < τSH . Let us again
4There is an issue of replacement in a set. With some abuse of notation, allow Hu
′
n to allow
multiples of the same element.
5We will compare the actions of two buyers, when they randomize, we would like them to always
randomize in the same way, as if using perfectly correlated random numbers. With some abuse of
notation, I suppose σBH ∈ {0, 1}. If σBH ∈ (0, 1), I consider this as two cases separately.
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consider a buyer who encounters two histories that differ only in the t
th
position. Now
the buyer that encounters a seller playing soft has a higher belief. As in the earlier
case, before the t
th
trade, buyers are identical. Now we must consider the buyer’s
action in the t
th
period.
Case 3, subcase 1: The buyer plays soft in the t
th
period.
If the buyer plays soft, then the buyer who encounters a seller playing tough has
the same number of units to trade as the buyer meeting a seller playing soft. In this
case the logic from the earlier case applies directly as well.
Case 3, subcase 2: The buyer plays tough in the t
th
period.
In this case one buyer has a higher belief, and the other buyer has more units left
to trade. I will show that because both buyers played tough in the t
th
period, the
effect of having a higher belief leads that buyer to play soft weakly more than the
buyer with more units left to trade.
Case 3, subcase 2, step 1: If τSH < τSL, then a buyer only plays soft after
he encounters a seller playing soft or if he played soft in the prior period.
If a buyer plays T and encounters a T , his belief drops, so this follows directly
from Lemma 1. Then any sequence of softs played by the buyer with the higher belief
will be also played by the buyer with the higher belief, but earlier. If this sequence
overlaps with another sequence, the result is postponed/increased.
Case 3, subcase 2, step 2: If τSH < τSL, then for each u ∈ {1, ..., n}, s(Hun) >
s(Hu−1n ).
The buyer encountering a seller playing tough has more units to trade and a lower
belief than the buyer encountering a seller playing soft. Again h and h′ differ in the
t
th
position, with e(ht) = T and e(h
′
t
) = S.
Let η = {ηj|e(hηj) = S, t + j > t}, so η1 is the first time after t that the buyers
encounter a seller playing soft. Furthermore, add η0 = t to η.
Let ξ = {ξ1, ..., ξ|η|}, with ξj = max{m|0 ≤ m ≤ ηj+1−ηj) and σB(yηj+m, βH(hηj+m)) =
1}. This set contains the lengths of periods after encountering a seller playing S that
the buyer with the lower belief plays soft for, until the buyer either stops playing soft
or encounters another seller playing soft. Note that ξ0 = 0, as the buyer with the
lower belief does not play soft after period t..
Let ν be the set analogously defined for the buyer with the higher belief as ξ, with-
out cutting off at the next encounter of soft, so νj = max{m|0 ≤ m and for allm′ ≤
m,σB(y′ηj+m′ , βH(h
′
ηj+m′)) = 1}. Note that ν0 may be greater than 0.
Claim:
∀t, 0 ≤ t < |η| − 1, νηt + s(h′ηt) ≥ ξηt+1 + s(hηt+1). (1.53)
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This claim follows directly from Lemmas 1 and 2, on the left the buyer with the
greater belief will play soft more than the buyer with the lesser belief on the right, as
he has seen more softs. Finally s(hn) = ξ|η| + s(hη), s(hn) ≤ s(h′n). This combined
with the probabilities earlier satisfies (1.51).
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Chapter 2
Equilibria in a Market with a Front Runner
A front runner uses information about incoming market orders to make
risk free profits. The direct effect of a front runner is the diversion of
surplus away from traders. In addition, a front runner’s existence may
affect the bidding strategies of traders who become less willing to reveal
trading surplus through their positions. This paper introduces a new
model of front running in order to study how front running distorts
equilibrium bidding and the implications for overall welfare. The front
runner reduces total surplus if traders’ values are distributed uniformly
and bidding strategies are linear. In general, for all distributions, the
front runner prevents the constrained efficient outcome from being an
equilibrium.
2.1 Introduction
Front running describes one of several activities in which a market participant
uses information about incoming market orders to gain a financial advantage. The
goal of this paper is to investigate the impact of a front runner who observes the
orders of a buyer and seller, and can place his own orders before the buyer’s or
seller’s reach the market. Holding the orders of the buyer and seller constant, a front
runner who extracts maximal surplus will reduce the payoffs of the buyer and seller.
This reduction in payoffs exactly equals the front runner’s profits, so total surplus is
unchanged.
However, the existence of a market front runner will change the behavior of agents,
and a different equilibrium will ensue. In this paper I examine a buyer and seller who
may trade in a double auction and have common knowledge about the existence
of a front runner. Holding the strategy of the seller fixed, if a front runner enters
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the market, then the buyer will bid lower. Bidding lower will increase his payoff
conditional on trading, while decreasing his probability of trading. The seller will
similarly raise her bid to increase her payoff conditional on trading.
If the seller increases her bid, the buyer will want to increase his bid to increase
his probability of trading. There are then two effects, a primary effect in which agents
reduce their chance at trading to increase their payoff from trading, and a secondary
effect in which agents react to their trading partner changing their bid. The question
we need to ask then is which of these two effects dominates, and how surplus is
ultimately affected.
In order to provide intuition I start with an example, specifying the buyer and
seller value distributions, as well as the equilibrium. In this example, I find that the
first effect dominates, and the front runner reduces total surplus. The reason for this
is that when a front runner enters the market, a buyer with a high value and a seller
with a low value shade their bid most, while sellers or buyers near the threshold of
trading cannot significantly shade their bids. Then the buyer with a very low value
must raise his bid to still be able to trade, while the buyer with a very high value
does not need to raise his bid. In this way a front runner might flatten the range of
bids that the buyer and seller submit, and reduce the surplus generated by a market.
To understand the impact of a front runner generally, we must compare the set of
equilibria with and without a front runner. I find that we cannot draw any conclusions
from the comparison between these two sets without selecting a pair of equilibria to
compare. We would like to compare the equilibria with maximal surplus, so we start
by considering the maximum surplus available under any mechanism. I find that
the front runner prevents a constrained efficient outcome. The intuition is that the
front runner takes surplus from the most profitable trades, which eliminates some less
profitable but still surplus-increasing trades. However, the double auction without
a front runner is unlikely to have a Bayesian Nash equilibrium that implements the
constrained efficient outcome. Thus we cannot compare the maximal surplus equilib-
ria with and without a front runner and attain an unambiguous answer. To compare
a particular pair of equilibria with and without a front runner, I characterize mono-
tonic equilibria as a function of the likelihood that a front runner exists. I use this
characterization to compare equilibria with and without a front runner that are close,
but find again an ambiguous answer.
Thus we must restrict attention to some distributions and equilibrium selection
rule to make stronger predictions regarding the impact of a front runner. I restrict
attention to linear equilibria and the uniform value distribution. These are the same
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restrictions as the ones in which the earlier example lives. Into this environment I
introduce a market maker, who provides an outside option to the buyer and seller.
The market maker lists a price at which he offers to buy a single unit, and a higher
price at which he offers to sell a single unit. The buyer and seller can participate in
the double auction by submitting bids between the market makers’ two prices, but
they will trade only if they both do this and the buyer bids a higher price than the
seller. If there is a front runner and the buyer trades with the seller, the front runner
affects the prices at which they trade. I show that even with the market maker,
under the uniform distribution and linear strategies, the front runner strictly reduces
surplus.
The paper is structured as follows. In the remainder of Section 2.1, I discuss other
work which examines either double auctions or front runners. In Section 2.2, I first
present the model and discuss its assumptions, then in Section 2.3 I introduce the
main market measures and present some general results. The general results provide
a method to construct comparable equilibria with and without a front runner, and
also compare the double auction with a front runner to a mechanism that yields the
second best outcome. Section 2.5 focuses on the uniform case to compare equilibria
with and without a front runner. This section provides stronger results regarding
total surplus, showing that a front runner always reduces total surplus. Finally I
conclude in Section 2.6.
2.1.1 Related Literature
An understanding of how front runners affect equilibrium strategies can help ex-
plain some impacts of high frequency trading. Using infrastructure advantages, high
frequency traders can very quickly see the orders in different markets. They can then
identify arbitrage opportunities created by different markets and act fast enough to
engage in latency arbitrage and make risk-free profits. In this way a high frequency
trader engaging in latency arbitrage acts as a market front runner. If, instead of al-
lowing a high frequency trader to take these arbitrages, the surplus created by agents
listing different prices is distributed to the agents ultimately trading, the two mar-
kets can act as a single market without a front runner.1 Wah and Wellman (2013)
study how total surplus is affected by a latency arbitrageur in a dynamic model, but
this is not an equilibrium analysis; in this paper I study how surplus is a one period
equilibrium model.
1For a description of the role of high frequency traders as market front runners on fragmented
markets, see Jones (2013).
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Although high frequency trading has made behaving as a front runner easier,
front runners are not a recent innovation. For an introduction to front runners, and
a series of models addressing their impacts, see Pagano and Roell (1992) or Danthine
and Moresi (1998). In their work, they consider the strategies of background traders
as exogenous, and focus on the impact of front runners on the volume of background
trade.
To endogenize the strategy of the buyer and seller, I consider a modification of
the bargaining problem analyzed by Chatterjee and Samuelson (1983): the double
auction. In a double auction with one buyer and one seller, the buyer and seller
simultaneously submit bids. If the buyer’s bid exceeds the seller’s, the two agents
trade at a price between the two bids, with k ∈ [0, 1] weight placed on the buyer’s
bid. In this work I fix k = 1
2
. I then add an outside option for the agents in the form
of a market maker.
Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) discuss the surplus generated from bilateral
trade like a double auction, showing the impossibility of an ex post efficient alloca-
tion. They discuss the surplus that can be generated by an incentive compatible and
individually rational mechanism (e.g., a double auction), and characterize equilibria
where this surplus is maximized. They also discuss how a broker (e.g., a market front
runner) who extracts or inserts money will affect total surplus.
A central problem of double auction analysis is the multiplicity of equilibria. Equi-
libria in discontinuous strategies are thoroughly discussed by Leininger et al. (1989),
and continuous strategy equilibria by Satterthwaite and Williams (1989). While dou-
ble auctions do not always maximize ex ante surplus over bargaining games, linear
strategy equilibria, if they exist, are shown by Satterthwaite and Williams (1989) to
be interim efficient2 and achieve almost all the surplus available from trade. A general
proof of the conditions necessary for efficiency is elusive.
Because a market with and without a front runner will have two different sets of
equilibria, to compare the outcomes we must compare the sets. I propose two ways
to compare the equilibria between the two markets. First, I look at the uniform dis-
tribution and linear strategies. Then I use a characterization of continuous equilibria
to compare equilibria between the two markets using a common feature of the two
equilibria.
Making assumptions regarding the distribution of values and the strategies in the
equilibrium allows us to directly calculate surplus, trading probabilities, and also
examine the impact of outside options. The uniform distribution has been used in
2This result holds under common assumptions, which appear in Section 2.2.2.
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several studies. Under the uniform distribution, linear strategies have been shown
to maximize surplus. Leininger et al. (1989) discuss linear strategies in depth. They
look at uniform value distributions, but also several other distributions, and find that
the equilibrium in linear strategies is very close to realizing all the gains from trade.
To quote “[efficiency] varies little over a wide range of priors” Leininger et al. (1989,
Page 97). For this reason I use linear strategies to construct equilibria in markets
with and without front runners. In this environment I find that the front runner
reduces total surplus.
Linear strategies are also supported by experimental evidence. Radner and Schot-
ter (1989) show in an experimental setting linear equilibria are often selected and
realize most of the available surplus.
2.2 Model
The model consists of a buyer and a seller with independent private values vB and
vS in [0, 1] for a single good. The buyer’s valuation is drawn from the cumulative
distribution function Fb and the seller’s value from Fs. Both densities fS and fB
are positive on (0, 1). Also in the market may be a market maker who offers to buy
and sell at two prices, a Bid and Ask, with Bid,Ask ∈ [0, 1], and Ask > Bid. The
prices are exogenous and observed by the buyer and seller, and the payoffs of the
market maker are neither calculated nor included in total surplus. If Bid = 0 and
Ask = 1, then I will say that the market maker does not exist. A market front
runner exists with probability α. The buyer and seller have common knowledge of
the market maker’s prices and α. The buyer and seller observe their private values,
then simultaneously submit bids to the market, the buyer submitting b and the seller
submitting s.
Trade is as follows. If b ≥ Ask then the buyer buys from the market maker, and
receives a payoff vB −Ask. If s ≤ Bid then the seller trades with the market maker,
and receives a payoff of Bid − vS. If Ask > b > s > Bid, then the buyer and seller
do not trade with the market maker, but trade with each other. In this case, if there
is a market front runner, then both the buyer and seller trade at their bid and offer,
and receive payoffs of vB − b and s− vS respectively. If there is no front runner, then
they trade at a price of b+s
2
. The buyer receives a payoff of vB − b+s2 , and the seller
receives a payoff of b+s
2
− vS. If either the buyer or the seller does not trade, he or
she receives a payoff of zero.
Total surplus is the ex ante measure of gains to trade realized. Total surplus
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consists of the payoffs the buyer and seller receive, as well as the surplus the market
front runner, if he exists, receives. The buyer and seller are risk neutral and maximize
expected profits. I study markets without a market maker in section 2.4.1 and with
a market maker in section 2.5. A market with a market maker M is parameterized
by (Ask,Bid, α, FB, FS), and a market without a market maker is parameterized by
(1, 0, α, FB, FS).
2.2.1 Discussion of Model
Several features of the model are worthy of additional discussion. The market
maker serves two purposes, both as a robustness check and as a representative of the
outside options traders have in the real world. In this sense the market maker reflects
either an explicit market maker, or the current best bid and best offer in an order
book. The market maker makes no profits due to competition. The exogeneity of the
market maker is because an asset’s underlying value distribution, and so the market
maker’s position, is independent of the existence of a front runner.
Of particular interest is how the front runner can come between the buyer and
seller. There are two natural interpretations, both matching the model presented here.
The first interpretation of the front runner is as an unscrupulous broker, who is an
agent who receives the orders of his client, then trades on his own account to extract
some of the surplus generated by his client’s orders. The second and more recent
interpretation is a high frequency trader who is able to engage in latency arbitrage.
Latency arbitrage is when the prices of a single stock in different markets (or highly
correlated stocks in the same market) differ for a very small period of time, and a high
frequency trader takes advantage of the price discrepancies. These opportunities exist
because fragmented markets may communicate more slowly than individual traders.
While this is not front running, it has the same economics as front running, and can
be considered as if front running. In either of these cases a market front runner can
extract surplus between a single buyer and seller.
If an unscrupulous broker decides to reform, it is clear that the buyer or seller will
extract additional surplus. In the second case, if fragmented markets communicate
faster than a high frequency trader can act, then orders submitted to different markets
will trade with each other, and more surplus will be received by the buyer or seller.
The likelihood of the front runner existing can be interpreted in several ways. The
first is that a front runner exists with some probability, and if he exists he intercedes
on every trade. The second, and more natural interpretation is that one or many
front runners exist, and intercede with some probability on any trade.
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2.2.2 Restriction on Distributions
It is difficult to analyze the equilibria of double auctions for arbitrary distributions.
For the remainder of the paper I restrict the distribution of values. Let R and T be
the inverse hazard rates:
R(vS) = FS(vS)/fs(vS), (2.1)
T (vB) = (FB(vB)− 1)/fB(vB). (2.2)
Furthermore, let cS and cB be the virtual reservation values:
cS(vS) = vS +R(vS), (2.3)
cB(vB) = vB + T (vB). (2.4)
These are functions that appear in the first-order conditions of the buyer and
seller. Consistent with earlier work, I assume that on (0, 1), R and T are C1, R > 0,
T < 0, and cS and cB are increasing.
2.3 Equilibrium
Recall that the buyer and seller have a common belief that a market front runner
exists, and common knowledge of the Bid and Ask. Given the Bid, Ask, and belief
α, a strategy for a buyer B : [0, 1] → [0, 1] maps his value vB to a bid b. Similarly
given the Bid, Ask, and α, a strategy for a seller S : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] maps her value vS
to an offer s.
Given the Bid, Ask, and α, a Bayesian Nash equilibrium consists of the pair
(B, S) such that each agent’s strategy maximizes his expected payoff conditional on
the other agent’s strategy.
Given S, let PB : [0, 1] → [0, 1] be a function mapping a bid b to the ex-interim
probability that a buyer trades with the seller, and let EB : [0, 1] × [0, 1] → [0, 1] be
a function mapping the buyer’s value vB and a bid b to the buyer’s expected payoff
conditional on trading with the seller. Given B, PS and ES are defined analogously:
PS maps the seller’s offer s to a probability of trade, and ES maps the offer and value
to an expected payoff conditional on trading.
2.3.1 Additional Definitions
I next provide several definitions to aid our understanding of equilibria.
57
Definition 5 (Regular Equilibrium). A regular equilibrium is a pair of strategies
(B, S) that constitute a Bayesian Nash equilibrium, such that:
1. both B and S are strictly increasing except where B(vB) ≥ Ask and S(vS) ≤
Bid,
2. B is differentiable where PB(B(vB)) > 0 and S is differentiable where PS(S(vS)) >
0,
3. for any v, if PB(B(v)) = 0 then B(v) = v, and if PS(S(v)) = 0 then S(v) = v.
The purpose of using regular equilibria is two-fold. First differentiable equilibria
are easier to analyze. Secondly, we can rule out equilibria like the no-trade equilibrium
in which B(vB) = 0 and S(vS) = 1, by forcing agents who would never trade to bid
their values.
Because strategies in a regular equilibrium are strictly increasing, we can define
inverse functions of the strategies, which map bids to values. Let σB : [0, 1] → [0, 1]
and σS : [0, 1] → [0, 1] be the inverse strategies, so σB(b) = vB if B(vB) = b, and
σS(s) = vS if S(vS) = s.
Definition 6 (Total Surplus). Given a market M = (Ask,Bid, α, FB, FS) and an
equilibrium (B, S) of that market, the expected total surplus TS(B, S) of the equi-
librium is:
TS(B, S) =
∫ 1
vB=0
∫ 1
vS=0
(vB − vS)pDA(vB, vS)fS(vS)fB(vB)dvSdvB (2.5)
+
∫ S−1(Bid)
vS=0
(Bid− vS)fS(vS)dvS +
∫ 1
vB=B−1(Ask)
(vB − Ask)fB(vB)dvB.
Because the front runner extracts the surplus between the buyer’s bid and the
seller’s offer, he neither creates nor destroys surplus, so the expected surplus of a
market depends only on the strategies of the buyer and seller.
Definition 7 (Trading Boundary). Suppose (B, S) is a regular equilibrium of a mar-
ket. Let TB = {(vB, b, vS)|B(vB) = b = S(vS)}. Then TB is the trading boundary.
The trading boundary defines the values of the buyer and seller which trade. The
trading boundary can be used to compare the surplus of two equilibria.
Lemma 8 (Greater trading boundary yields greater surplus). Consider two markets
M = (1, 0, α, FB, FS) M′ = (1, 0, α′, FB, FS). Let (B, S) be a regular equilibrium of
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M and (B′, S ′) be a regular equilibrium of M′. Suppose TB is the trading boundary
corresponding to (B, S) and TB′ is the trading boundary corresponding to (B′, S ′).
If for each (vB, vS) ∈ TB, there is a (vB, v′S) ∈ TB′ such that v′S ≤ vS, and for
some (vB, vS) ∈ TB there is a (vB, v′S) ∈ TB′ such that v′S < vS, then TS(B, S) >
TS(B′, S ′).
The proof is easy and omitted. Note that if one equilibrium yields a greater surplus
than another, the trading boundary corresponding to the greater surplus need not
include the other trading boundary.
2.3.1.1 Example: Uniform Distribution and Linear Strategies
In order to better understand the results, I present two equilibria of two markets
without market makers, one with a front runner (α = 1), and one without (α = 0),
in which the buyer and seller value distributions are uniform. I present the total
surplus and trading boundaries for this example, and will later use one or both of
these equilibria to demonstrate results regarding trading ranges and total surplus.
Without a market maker, the linear strategy equilibrium discussed by Chatterjee
and Samuelson (1983) is an equilibrium here. This is:
B(vB) =
2
3
vB +
1
12
, and
S(vS) =
2
3
vS +
1
4
.
The total surplus is 9
64
, and the trading boundary is defined by {(vB, vS)|vB = vS+ 14}.
With a front runner, the linear strategy equilibrium is:
B(vB) =
1
2
vB +
1
6
, and
S(vS) =
1
2
vS +
1
3
.
The total surplus is 9
64
and the trading boundary is defined by {(vB, vS)|vB = vS + 13}.
The front runner receives a profit of 2
81
.3 Note that this trading boundary is within
the trading boundary from the equilibrium without a front runner. Next, several
results without a market maker are provided.
3While neither of the above is a regular equilibrium, they can easily be adjusted to regular
equilibria if the low-value buyers and high-value sellers, those outside the trading ranges, bid their
values.
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2.4 Results without a Market Maker
We would like to compare the surplus generated by the double auction without a
front runner to the surplus generated by the double auction with a front runner. To
do this we first must select a pair of equilibria. Because an equilibrium with no trade
always exists with or without a front runner, some equilibrium with a front runner
will always yield greater surplus than some equilibrium without a front runner, and
vice versa. A starting point then is to examine the best, or surplus maximizing,
equilibrium with or without a front runner. Although we cannot compare these
directly, we can compare each to an equilibrium of a mechanism which generates the
maximum surplus.
2.4.1 Mechanisms
In order to examine the efficiency of an equilibrium in a market with a front
runner, we must consider the broader space of mechanisms. Let p : [0, 1]2 → [0, 1] be a
trading rule, mapping buyer and seller reported values to a likelihood of trade, and let
x : [0, 1]2 → [0, 1] be the transfer rule. A mechanism is defined by a trading rule and a
transfer rule. Conditional on x then, the seller with value vS and reported type v
′
S has
an interim expected payoff of US(vS, v
′
S, p, x) =
∫ 1
vB=0
(x(vB, v
′
S)− vSp(vB, v′S)) dvB,
and the buyer with type vB who reports type v
′
B has an interim expected payoff of
UB(vB, v
′
B, p, x) =
∫ 1
vS=0
(vBp(v
′
B, vS)− x(v′B, vS)) dvS.
A mechanism (p, x) is incentive compatible if given a vS, for all v
′
S, US(vS, vS, p, x) ≥
US(vS, v
′
S, p, x). And a mechanism is individually rational if for all vS, US(vS, vS, p, x) ≥
0.
The purpose of this additional notation is to compare the double auction to other
mechanisms through the revelation principle. In particular I will compare the maxi-
mal surplus generated by the double auction with the maximal surplus generated by
any incentive compatible and individually rational mechanism in Theorem 5.
Given B and S, let pDA : [0, 1]
2 → {0, 1} be the trading rule for the double
auction, so
pDA(vB, vS) =
{
1 : Bid > B(vB) ≥ S(vS) > Ask
0 : otherwise.
(2.6)
Let
Γ(p) =
∫ 1
vB=0
∫ 1
vS=0
(cB(vB)− cS(vS))p(vB, vS)fS(vS)fB(vB)dvSdvB. (2.7)
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This function provides access to mechanism design results from Myerson and Sat-
terthwaite (1983) and Satterthwaite and Williams (1989) regarding the efficiency and
total surplus generated by a mechanism.
Theorem 5 (A front runner precludes maximal total surplus). Consider a market
M = (1, 0, α, FB, FS) with α > 0, so that there is no market maker, and a front runner
acts with some positive probability. Then for any equilibrium (B, S) of M, there is
another mechanism that is incentive compatible and individually rational that yields
a greater total surplus.
The outline of the proof is as follows. First we use the equilibrium with the front
runner to construct a mechanism using Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983). Then we
can use necessary conditions from Satterthwaite and Williams (1989, Theorem 2.2)
to show that that this equilibrium is not ex ante efficient. Finally, since it is not ex
ante efficient there must be another mechanism yielding greater surplus.
Proof. Take an equilibrium with a front runner (B, S).
Then the pDA corresponding to the double auction with the front runner is:
pDA(vB, vS) =
{
1 : B(vB) ≥ S(vS)
0 : B(vB) < S(vS)
(2.8)
And the buyer’s interim expected payoff when having value vB and playing as
value v′B is:
PB(B(v
′
B))EB(vB, B(v
′
B)) =
∫ 1
vS=0
pDA(v
′
B, vs)(vB −B(v′B))f(vS)dvS. (2.9)
I use pDA to construct a transfer rule x as follows:
x(vB , vS) = pDA(vB , vS)(
B(vB)+S(vS)
2
) (2.10)
+
∫ 1
vs=0
pDA(vB , vs)
(
B(vB)− S(vs)
2
)
fS(vs)dvs −
∫ 1
vb=0
pDA(vb, vS)
(
B(vb)− S(vS)
2
)
fB(vb)dvb
From [2.8-2.10], a buyer with value vB under the new transfer rule has interim
expected value:
UB(vB , v
′
B , pDA, x) =
∫ 1
vs=0
pDA(v
′
B , vS)vBfS(vS)dvS −
∫ 1
vs=0
pDA(v
′
B , vS)(
B(v′B) + S(vS)
2
)fS(vS)dvS (2.11)
−
∫ 1
vS=0
∫ 1
vs=0
pDA(v
′
B , vs)
(
B(v′B)− S(vs)
2
)
fS(vs)fS(vS)dvsdvS +
∫ 1
vS=0
∫ 1
vb=0
pDA(vb, vS)
(
B(vb)− S(vS)
2
)
fB(vb)fS(vS)dvbdvS
Simplifying [2.11], the buyer’s interim payoff is:
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UB(vB, v
′
B, pDA, x) =
∫ 1
vS=0
pDA(v
′
B, vs)(vB −B(v′B))f(vS)dvS (2.12)
+
∫ 1
vb=0
∫ 1
vs=0
pDA(vb, vS)
(
B(vb)− S(vS)
2
)
fB(vb)fS(vS)dvbdvS.
Note that the difference between [2.9] and [2.12], the interim expected payoff of a
buyer in the double auction compared to in the constructed mechanism, is half the
front runner’s expected profits. Because the front runner’s profits are never negative,
(pDA, x) constitute an incentive compatible and individually rational mechanism.
There are then two cases: the front runner has expected profits of zero, or the
front runner has expected profits greater than zero.
Case 1: The front runner’s expected profits exceed zero.
In this case because Γ(pDA) equals the front runner’s profits, from Γ(pDA) =
PB(0) + PS(1) and from Satterthwaite and Williams (1989, Theorem 2.2) the double
auction with a front runner must not be ex ante efficient.
Case 2: The front runner’s expected profits are zero.
Because strategies must be weakly increasing, for no vB < 1 and vS > 0, can
B(vB) > S(vS). From Satterthwaite and Williams (1989, Theorem 2.2), if (p, x) is ex
ante efficient then there must be scalars s, t, such that:
pDA(vB, vS) =
{
1 : vB + sT (vB) ≥ vS + rR(vS)
0 : vB + sT (vB) < vS + rR(vS).
(2.13)
But recall that T (1) = 0 and R(0) = 0, and R > 0 and T < 0. So pDA cannot
satisfy [2.13], and the equilibrium with a front runner must not be ex ante efficient.
From Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983, Theorem 2), a mechanism that maximizes
expected gains from trade and also satisfies individual rationality and incentive com-
patibility must exist. However as Satterthwaite and Williams (1989, Theorem 5.1)
show, a surplus-maximizing equilibrium of the 1
2
-double auction need not maximize
total surplus over the set of mechanisms. While this result does speak to the surplus
of a double auction with a front runner, it cannot directly compare the equilibria in
a double auction with a front runner to the equilibria without a front runner.
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2.4.2 Close Equilibria
Although we cannot compare the maximal surplus of the double auction with a
front runner to that without a front runner, we may be able to compare equilibria
between the two sets that are similar, if two equilibria can be classified as similar. In
order to make such a comparison I characterize equilibria in the next theorem.
Theorem 6 (Linked differential equations). Given a market parameterized by
(1, 0, α, FB, FS) (without a market maker), all regular equilibria can be characterized
by two differential equations. For vB > S(0) and vS < B(1):
σ′S(b) =
(
1 + α
2
)
R(vS)/(vB − b), and (2.14)
σ′B(b) =
(
1 + α
2
)
T (vB)/(vS − b). (2.15)
Recall that vB = σB(b) and vS = σS(b).
Furthermore, if B and S are strictly increasing differentiable functions satisfying
[2.14-2.15] for vB > S(0) and vS < B(1), and if B(vB) = vB for vB < S(0) and
S(vS) = vS for vS > B(1), then (B, S) constitutes an equilibrium. Finally, for
any vS, vB, b, such that 0 < vS < b < vB < 1, an equilibrium exists such that
S(vS) = b = B(vB).
Proof. The proof is identical to the differential equations derived in Satterthwaite
and Williams (1989, Theorem 3.2).
For markets without a market maker, we can use the differential equations to
create two similar equilibria with different likelihoods of a front runner. From these
two equilibria we then calculate the trading boundary and total surplus, allowing us
to compare the outcomes with and without a front runner. It is worth noting that
Theorem 6 does not generate closed form equilibria, so equilibria must be constructed
numerically.
Comparing equilibria requires us to select both an equilibrium with a front runner
and an equilibrium without a front runner. To make these selections we start with
any regular equilibrium, with some probability of a front runner. We pick a point
on the interior of that trading boundary of that equilibrium, which is vB ∈ (0, 1),
vS ∈ (0, 1) such that B(vB) = S(vS). From this point on the trading boundary of an
equilibrium without a front runner, we can construct an equilibrium with a different
probability of a front runner using Theorem 6. The idea of this mapping is that
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for some pair of values, vB and vS, the buyer and seller submit the same bids, and
trade with the same likelihoods. Buyer and seller values close to this point are also
submitting bids that are similar between the two equilibria, so we will call these two
equilibria close.
Generally I find that increasing the likelihood of the front runner causes strategies
to become steeper, and the range of prices at which trade can occur will decrease. This
is consistent with the front runner causing strategies to become flatter. However for
some distributions and start points this is not true, as in Figure 2.5 in the Appendix.
The trading boundary is much more difficult to interpret. Even for the same pair
of value distributions, the starting point on the trading boundary and the price can
determine whether increasing the likelihood of the front runner moves the trading
boundary inside or outside of the original trading boundary. As a result, the impact
on surplus is highly ambiguous using this method. This ambiguity highlights the
importance of equilibrium selection.
2.5 Uniform Distribution and Linear Strategies
By applying Theorem 6 numerically, one can demonstrate that introducing a front
runner can actually increase total surplus. If we know the distribution of buyer and
seller values and apply a selection rule, then we can calculate the equilibria and total
surplus directly. For the remainder of the paper I assume the uniform distribution,
that is FB(vB) = vB and FS(vS) = vS. Note that from Chatterjee and Samuelson
(1983) we know that the double auction yields the second best surplus, and so from
Theorem 5 the linear equilibrium without a front runner yields a greater total surplus
than any equilibrium with a front runner.
From the starting point of the linear equilibrium, which yields the second best
outcome without a front runner, I will reintroduce the market maker. I then define
a linear strategy with a threshold which will allow us to compare the outcomes with
and without a front runner directly.
Definition 8 (Linear threshold strategy). A linear threshold strategy is one of
the following:
1. A strategy B parameterized by β0, β1, vB, with vB ∈ (0, 1), such that B(vB) =
β0 + β1vB for vB < vB and B(vB) = Ask for vB ≥ vB.
2. A strategy S parameterized by η0, η1, vS, with vS ∈ (0, 1), such that S(vS) =
η0 + η1vS for vS < vS and S(vS) = Bid for vS ≥ vS.
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Eqm strategies without a front runner: Eqm strategies with a front runner:
β00
1
54
(−4 + 9(Bid+Ask) + 2√4− 9(Ask −Bid)) β10 132 (−3 + 8(Bid+Ask) +√9− 16(Ask −Bid))
β01
2
3
β11
1
2
η00
1
54
(4 + 9(Bid+Ask)− 2√4− 9(Ask −Bid)) η10 132 (3 + 8(Bid+Ask)−√9− 16(Ask −Bid))
η01
2
3
η11
1
2
v0B
Bid+Ask
2
+ 4
9
−
√
16
81
− 4
9
(Ask −Bid) v1B 116 (9 + 8(Ask +Bid)− 3
√
9− 16(Ask −Bid))
v0S
Bid+Ask
2
− 4
9
+
√
16
81
− 4
9
(Ask −Bid) v1S 116 (−9 + 8(Bid+Ask) + 3
√
9− 16(Ask −Bid))
Figure 2.1: Strategies of linear threshold equilibria without a front runner on the left and
with a front runner on the right.
Definition 9 (Linear threshold equilibria). An equilibrium of a market M (B, S, α)
is a linear threshold equilibrium if both B and S are linear threshold strategies.
Note that for some (Bid,Ask, α), a linear threshold equilibrium does not exist.
For example, if Bid = 0 then there cannot exist a strategy S such that for some vS
it is optimal for a seller with value vS < vS to bid Bid.
2.5.1 A Deterministic Front Runner
First I solve for the two linear threshold equilibria with α ∈ {0, 1} as a function
of Ask and Bid. These are found in Figure 2.1. Note that the equilibrium strategies
described in Figure 2.1 do not constitute an equilibrium if Bid = 0 and Ask = 1; in
this case no buyer or seller would ever trade with the market maker. This is reflected
by invalid strategy parameters (e.g., vB > 1), and there are no linear threshold
equilibria. The next section discusses this issue.
2.5.1.1 Equilibrium Existence
As discussed earlier, if Bid = 0 and Ask = 1, a linear threshold equilibrium does
not exist. The space of parameters for which linear threshold equilibria exist is:(
Ask ≤ 2
3
and 4
√
16− 18Ask + 9(Ask +Bid) > 16
)
, (2.16)
or
(
4
3
√
2− 2Ask + Ask +Bid > 2 and Ask > 7
9
)
,
or
(
Ask >
2
3
and Ask <
7
9
and Ask ≤ 4
9
+Bid
)
.
The space of equilibrium existence is displayed in Figure 2.2 and is found in the
Appendix.
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Figure 2.2: Parameter space for linear threshold equilibrium existence.
2.5.2 Uniqueness of Linear Threshold Equilibria
Lemma 9 (Uniqueness of linear threshold equilibria). If Bid and Ask satisfy the
inequalities in (2.16), then there exists a unique linear threshold equilibrium for α = 0
and a unique linear threshold equilibrium for α = 1.
For either α = 1 or α = 0, the proof follows directly from the derivation of the
equilibrium strategies in the appendix. Equilibrium existence comes automatically.
If the seller follows a linear threshold strategy, then there is a unique best response
from the buyer’s first-order condition. The two first order-conditions yield a system
of equations with two solutions. One of the solutions corresponds to a case in which
either vS < 0 or vB > 1 or both, which is not an equilibrium, so there is at most one
equilibrium.
2.5.3 Total surplus
As discussed earlier, surplus consists of the payoffs the buyer and seller receive, as
well as the surplus the market front runner, if he exists, receives. The market maker
is assumed to make no profits. In calculating total surplus, recall that the buyer’s
and seller’s private values are distributed uniformly in [0, 1].
Theorem 7 (A Market Front Runner Decreases Total Surplus). For any (Bid,Ask)
satisfying [2.16], TS0 > TS1, the total surplus of the linear threshold equilibrium with
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a front runner is strictly less than the total surplus of the linear threshold equilibrium
without a front runner.
The proof comes directly from (2.44) in the appendix, for no market maker pa-
rameters Bid and Ask is TS0 − TS1 negative.
2.5.4 An Example of an Equilibrium with and without a Front Runner
For example, if Bid = 0.3 and Ask = 0.7, the equilibrium strategies with and
without a front runner are as follows:
B0(vB) = 0.12 +
2
3
vB v0B = 0.804 (2.17)
S0(vS) = 0.22 +
2
3
vS v0S = 0.196 (2.18)
B1(vB) = 0.21 +
1
2
vB v1B = 0.766 (2.19)
S1(vS) = 0.29 +
1
2
vS v1S = 0.234 (2.20)
The resulting trades for different values of vB and vS are depicted in Figure 2.3.
As can be seen in that figure, the region of surplus from trade is strictly greater when
there is not a front runner. Note that a buyer with a low value bids more in the
equilibrium with a front runner than the equilibrium without a front runner. This is
because he needs to increase his probability of trade, since in the equilibrium without
a front runner there are sellers making much lower offers. For higher values, buyers
in an equilibrium with a front runner bid lower in order to maximize their profits.
This demonstrates the condensing effect a front runner has on the bids.
2.5.5 Probabilistic Front Runner
In this section we examine the equilibria when there is a front runner with prob-
ability α ∈ (0, 1). The derivation of the strategies in Figure 2.4 is found in the
appendix.
After finding the strategies, we find the parameter values Bid and Ask for which
a linear threshold equilibrium exists for any α, and find the range to be identical to
the range for the deterministic front runner. We then apply strategies from Figure
2.4 to find total surplus in the appendix.
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Figure 2.3: A graph of the trade that takes place for different buyer and seller values when
there is and is not a front runner. The regions of no trade, trade with the market maker,
and trade between the agents are labeled. The difficulty of making generalizations about
the linear threshold equilibrium is apparent.
β0
(α+1)
(
2
(√
(α+2)2(−(α+3)2Ask+(α+3)2Bid+(α+2)2)+9Ask+9Bid−4
)
+α(α((α+8)Ask+(α+8)Bid−2)+21Ask+21Bid−8)
)
2(α+2)(α+3)3
β1
2
3+α
η0
(α+1)
(
α(α((α+8)Ask+(α+8)Bid+2)+21Ask+21Bid+8)−2
(√
(α+2)2(−(α+3)2Ask+(α+3)2Bid+(α+2)2)−9Ask−9Bid−4
))
2(α+2)(α+3)3
η1
2
3+α
vS
√
(α+2)2(−(α+3)2Ask+(α+3)2Bid+(α+2)2)
(α+3)2
+ 2
α+3
− 1
(α+3)2
+ 1
2
(Ask + Bid− 2)
vB −
√
(α+2)2(−(α+3)2Ask+(α+3)2Bid+(α+2)2)
(α+3)2
− 2
α+3
+ 1
(α+3)2
+ 1
2
(Ask + Bid + 2)
Figure 2.4: Equilibrium linear threshold strategies with a probabilistic front runner.
These match the strategies in Figure 2.1 for α ∈ {0, 1}.
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Theorem 8. For Bid,Ask such that a linear threshold equilibrium exists for α ∈
(0, 1), dTS
α
dα
< 0.
The proof follows directly from the fact that in the range where equilibria exist,
the value of dTS
α
dα
is always strictly negative, except for α = 0, 2
9
< Bid < 1
3
, and Ask = 4
9
+ Bid at
which point dTS
α
dα
does not exist.
2.6 Conclusion
A front runner is an agent who has knowledge about the stream of orders coming
into a market, and can act on this knowledge to make profit. Past research involving
front runners has not allowed agents to strategically respond to the existence of a front
runner. In this work I use an equilibrium model to examine how agents’ beliefs in a
front runner’s existence preclude the second best outcome, and in the linear uniform
case unambiguously reduce total surplus. It appears that the existence of the front
runner affects the market by dampening the bids which traders submit. This affects
the probabilities of trade for agents with extreme values in a clear way; for example
a buyer with a low value can no longer trade, and a buyer with a high value is less
likely to trade. The impact on a buyer or seller with a value near the middle of the
trading range is ambiguous.
This research shows that a front runner unambiguously decreases surplus when
buyer and seller values are distributed uniformly and the linear strategy equilibrium
is selected (with or without a market maker). However this result does not generalize
for a different pair of value distributions or a different equilibrium selection rule.
Furthermore, there is no obvious comparison between the two sets of equilibria. For
a given pair of value distributions, there is always an equilibrium with a front runner
that yields a greater surplus than some equilibrium without a front runner; the reverse
is also true. This remains true even if we restrict attention to regular equilibria. Also,
because it is difficult to find a surplus maximizing equilibrium in this framework,
we cannot generally draw conclusions regarding the comparison between the surplus
maximizing equilibria with and without a front runner. Finally, while Section 2.4.2
introduced a way to compare equilibria with and without a front runner that are
similar, using this approach we also find that introducing the front runner can increase
or decrease surplus, depending on the equilibria being selected.
Although the results do suggest that a front runner will decrease total surplus,
either when selecting the linear equilibrium or the surplus maximizing equilibrium,
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they are far from conclusive. In ongoing research, numerical analysis has shown that
for some finite support distributions a regular equilibrium4 with a market front runner
can yield a greater surplus than any regular equilibrium without a front runner.
Although the linear equilibria in the uniform case suggests that regulations should
restrict agents from behaving as front runners, more research can be done to determine
more general conditions under which total surplus is reduced or improved. As a
result, it is still too early to understand exactly what impact front running has, and
how regulation would affect market outcomes. Future work may impose additional
equilibrium selection rules for a more clear answer.
4By regular equilibrium I mean that strategies are weakly increasing, and, if an agent has no
opportunity for profitable trade, then she bids her value.
70
References
Budish, E., P. Cramton, and J. Shim (2013): “The High-Frequency Trading
Arms Race: Frequent Batch Auctions as a Market Design Response,” .
Chatterjee, K. and W. Samuelson (1983): “Bargaining under Incomplete In-
formation,” Operations Research, 31, 835–851.
Danthine, J.-P. and S. Moresi (1998): “Front-Running by Mutual Fund Man-
agers: A Mixed Bag,” European Finance Review, 2, 29–56.
Jones, C. M. (2013): “What Do We Know About High-Frequency Trading?” .
Leininger, W., P. Linhart, and R. Radner (1989): “Equilibria of the Sealed-
Bid Mechanism for Bargaining with Incomplete Information,” Journal of Economic
Theory, 48, 63–106.
Myerson, R. B. and M. A. Satterthwaite (1983): “Efficient Mechanisms for
Bilateral Trading,” Journal of Economic Theory, 29, 265–281.
Pagano, M. and A. Roell (1992): “Front Running and Stock Market Liquidity,”
in Financial Market Liberalization and the Role of Banks, ed. by V. Conti and
R. Hamaui, Cambridge University Press.
Radner, R. and A. Schotter (1989): “The Sealed-Bid Mechanism: An Experi-
mental Study,” Journal of Economic Theory, 48, 179–220.
Satterthwaite, M. A. and S. R. Williams (1989): “Bilateral Trade with the
Sealed Bid k-Double Auction: Existence and Efficiency,” Journal of Economic
Theory, 48, 107–133.
Seppi, D. J. (1997): “Liquidity Provision with Limit Orders and a Strategic Spe-
cialist,” The Review of Financial Studies, 10, 103–150.
71
Wah, E. and M. Wellman (2013): “Latency Arbitrage, Market Fragmentation,
and Efficiency: A Two-Market Model,” in Proceedings of the 14th ACM Conference
on Electronic Commerce, vol. 1, 855–872.
Williams, S. R. (1987): “Efficient Performance in Two Agent Bargaining,” Journal
of Economic Theory, 172, 154–172.
2.7 Appendix
2.7.1 Calculation of Optimal Linear Strategies
I first solve for the values of vB
α, βα1 , β
α
0 , vS
α, ηα1 , η
α
0 , where α = 1, and there is
a front runner, then α = 0, when a front runner does not exist. To solve for those
values I use the first-order conditions.
2.7.1.1 Buyer Payoff Maximization
The expected value of a buyer who submits a bid b < Ask is:
PαB(b)E
α
B(vB, b). (2.21)
Recall that PαB gives the probability that a buyer trades with the seller, and E
α
B is
the expected value of a buyer conditional on trading. Given Sα(vS) = η
α
1 vS + η
α
1 ,
PαB(b) = Pr{b > o > Bid} =
b− ηα0
ηα1
− vαS , (2.22)
and
EαB(vB, b) = α(vB − b) + (1− α)
(
vB −
(
b+
b+ηα1 v
α
S+η
α
0
2
2
))
. (2.23)
From Equations [2.22] and [2.23], the expected payoff of a buyer who submits a bid
b < Ask is:
PαB(b)E
α
B(vB, b) =
(
b− ηα0
ηα1
− vαS
)(
α(vB − b) + (1− α)
(
vB −
(
b+
b+ηα1 v
α
S+η
α
0
2
2
)))
.
(2.24)
Differentiating [2.24] yields a first-order condition for α = 1 of:
b = B1(vB) =
vB
2
+
η10 + v
1
S1η
1
1
2
, (2.25)
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and when there is not a front runner (α = 0), differentiating 2.24 yields a first-order
condition of:
b = B0(vB) =
2vB
3
+
η00 + v
0
Sη
0
1
3
. (2.26)
At the threshold, when vB = vαB, the buyer is indifferent between buying from the
market maker and submitting a bid to potentially trade with the seller, so:
vαB −Ask =
(
Bα(vαB)− ηα0
ηα1
− vαS
)α(vαB −Bα(vαB)) + (1− α)
vαB −
Bα(vαB) + Bα(vαB)+η1vS+η02
2
 .
(2.27)
2.7.1.2 Seller expected value maximization
Setting up the same optimality for the seller’s strategy yields an expected payoff
for submitting an offer above Bid of:
PαSE
α
S (vS, o) =
(
vαB −
o− βα0
βα1
)(
vS − αo− (1− α)
(
o+
o+βα1 v
α
B+β
α
0
2
2
))
(2.28)
which gives a first-order condition of:
o = S1(vS) =
vS
2
+
β10 + v
1
Bβ
1
1
2
, (2.29)
and
o = S0(vS) =
2vS
3
+
β00 + v
1
Bβ
0
1
3
. (2.30)
The seller’s threshold condition is:
Bid− vαS =
(
vαB −
Sα(vαS )− βα0
βα1
)vαS − αSα(vαS )− (1− α)
Sα(vαS ) + Sα(vαS )+βα1 vαB+βα02
2
 (2.31)
2.7.1.3 Equilibrium strategies
Using Equations [2.25], [2.26], [2.27], [2.29], [2.30], and [2.31], vB, β1, β0, vS, η1, η0
are identified as functions of (Bid,Ask, α). These are stated in Figure 2.1. It is easy
to verify then that the linear strategies with cutoff types described above constitute
an equilibrium.
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2.7.2 Space of Equilibrium Existence
With a market front runner, a linear threshold equilibrium exists if v1B, v
1
S ∈ (0, 1).
This is true if:
0 < Bid ≤ 2
9
and Bid < Ask <
3
√
Bid√
2
−Bid, (2.32)
or if
2
9
< Bid < 1 and Bid < Ask <
3
4
√
1 + 8Bid− 1
4
(1 + 4Bid). (2.33)
Without a market front runner, a linear threshold equilibrium exists if v0B, v
0
S ∈ (0, 1).
This holds true if:
0 < Bid ≤ 2
9
and Bid < Ask <
4
√
2Bid
3
−Bid, (2.34)
or if
2
9
< Bid <
1
3
and Bid < Ask ≤ 1
9
(4 + 9Bid), (2.35)
or if
1
3
≤ Bid < 1 and Bid < Ask < 1
9
(2− 9Bid) + 4
√
18Bid− 2
9
. (2.36)
The intersection of those two ranges characterizes the parameter space for which
both equilibria exist:
Ask ≤ 2
3
and 4
√
16− 18Ask + 9(Ask +Bid) > 16 (2.37)
or
4
3
√
2− 2Ask + Ask +Bid > 2 and Ask > 7
9
or Ask >
2
3
and Ask <
7
9
and Ask ≤ 4
9
+Bid.
An image of the space described by [2.16] is provided in Figure 2.2. The inequalities
in [2.16] will be used later to discuss the equilibria.
Recall the buyer and seller expected value from trade between the spread in [2.24]
and [2.28], and their threshold conditions in equations [2.27] and [2.31]. Using [2.27]
and [2.31], and the first-order conditions from [2.24] and [2.28].
74
2.7.3 Total Surplus
The expected contribution to total surplus of the buyer trading with the market
maker is:∫ 1
vB
(vB − Ask)dvB = |vB=vBvB=1 (
v2B
2
− vBAsk) = (1
2
− Ask)− (vB
2
2
− vBAsk), (2.38)
and the analog for the seller is:∫ vS
0
(Bid− vS)dvS = |vS=vSvS=0 (vS ·Bid−
v2S
2
) = (vS ·Bid− vS
2
2
). (2.39)
The expected contribution to total surplus from trade between the buyer and seller
is: ∫ vB=vB
vB=η1vS+η0
∫ vS=(β1vB+β0−η0)/η1
vS=vS
(vB − vS)dvBdvS. (2.40)
Combining [2.38], [2.39], and [2.40], we find a total surplus of:
TS = 1
6
(
6AskvB − 6Ask + (2.41)
1
β21
(
(η0 + η1vS − vB)
(
3β20 + 3β0(β1 − 1)(η0 + η1vS + vB) + vS
(3β21(η0 + vB)− 2β1η1(2η0 + vB) + η1(2η0 + vB))
+vS
2 (3β21(η1 − 1)− 2β1η21 + η21)− (2β1 − 1)
(η20 + η0vB + vB
2)
))
+ 6BidvS − 3vB2 − 3vS2 + 3
)
.
Substituting in the strategies from Figure 2.1 into [2.41], the expected total surplus
in a market with a market front runner is:
TS1 =
1
32
(
16 + 8Ask2 +Ask
(
−23 + 16Bid− 3√9− 16Ask + 16Bid
)
+Bid
(
−9 + 8Bid+ 3√9− 16Ask + 16Bid
))
.
(2.42)
The same total surplus in a market without a front runner is:
TS0 =
1
1944
(
486Ask2 + 9Bid
(
−42 + 54Bid− 23
√
4− 9(Ask −Bid)
)
+ 4
(
251 + 4
√
4− 9(Ask −Bid)
)
(2.43)
+9Ask
(
−174 + 108Bid+ 23
√
4− 9(Ask −Bid)
))
.
The difference in total surplus, [2.43]− [2.42] is:
TS
0 − TS1 = 1
7776
(
64
(
2 +
√
4− 9Ask + 9Bid
)
+ 9(Ask − Bid)(−75 + 92
√
4− 9(Ask − Bid) + 81
√
9− 16(Ask − Bid))
)
(2.44)
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2.7.4 Total Surplus with a Probablistic Front Runner
TSα = 1
24
(
α2(3Ask− 3Bid− 4) + (2.45)
(
(α+3)2(α(α(α(α+8)+18)+48)+69)Bid+4(α−1)(α(α(α+9)+15)+3)(α+2)2
)√
(α+2)2
(
−(α+3)2Ask+(α+3)2Bid+(α+2)2
)
(α+2)(α+3)5
+2(α + 2)
(
3(α + 3)5Bid2 + 3(α(α(5α + 13)− 5)− 21)(α + 3)2Bid + 2(α(α(α(α(12α + 97) + 344) + 762) + 1104) + 753)
)
+α(3Ask− 3Bid + 4)
+Ask
((
− 48
(α+3)3
+ 3
α+2
− 1
)√
(α + 2)2
(−(α + 3)2Ask + (α + 3)2Bid + (α + 2)2)− 6(α(α(9α+49)+103)+87)
(α+3)3
+ 12Bid
)
+ 6Ask2
)
.
Taking the derivative of total surplus with respect to α yields:
dTSα
dα
= 1
24(α+3)6
√
(α+2)2
(
−(α+3)2Ask+(α+3)2Bid+(α+2)2
) (2.46)
(α + 1)
(
2α8(Ask− Bid− 4)(Ask− Bid− 1) + α7
(
46Ask2 − Ask(92Bid + 219) + Bid(46Bid + 219) + 164
)
+α6
(
462Ask2 − 3Ask(308Bid− 2κ + 691) + 3Bid(154Bid− 2κ + 691)− 8κ + 1436
)
+α5
(
2598Ask2 + Ask(−5196Bid + 105κ− 10658) + Bid(2598Bid− 105κ + 10658)− 132κ + 6604
)
+α4
(
8778Ask2 − 33Ask(532Bid− 23κ + 956) + 33Bid(266Bid− 23κ + 956)− 876κ + 16876
)
+α3
(
9
(
−3956AskBid + Ask(1978Ask− 5851) + 1978Bid2
)
+ 2694κ(Ask− Bid) + 52659Bid− 2572κ + 23104
)
+3α2
(
6750Ask2 + Ask(−13500Bid + 1512κ− 14399) + 6750Bid2 − 4(378Bid + 257)κ + 14399Bid + 4384
)
+3α
(
3510Ask2 − 3Ask(2340Bid− 297κ + 880) + 3Bid(1170Bid− 297κ + 880)− 32(5κ + 26)
)
+12(549Ask− 549Bid + 92(κ− 4)) + 81(Ask− Bid)(12Ask− 12Bid− 5κ)
)
,
where κ =
√
(2 + α)2 ((2 + α)2 − (3 + α)2Ask + (3 + α)2Bid).
2.7.5 Numerically Generated Equilibria
Using theorem 6 we compare equilibria with and without a front runner using a
common starting point. Under the uniform distribution these are depicted in Figure
2.5.
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Figure 2.5: In the case where both the buyer and seller have values distributed
uniformly, we calculate equilibria with (α = 1) and without (α = 0) a front runner.
We find that strategies without a front runner are generally steeper, except for high
buyer and seller values. This causes trades to happen with a front runner that would
not happen without a front runner.
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Chapter 3
Efficiency in a Non-Stationary Decentralized
Market
with Stephan Lauermann
The paper studies the possibility of information aggregation and effi-
ciency in a non-stationary, dynamic matching and bargaining model with
strictly positive, non-vanishing frictions. The allocation that results from
decentralized trade is shown to approach over time an efficient allocation
if the good is divisible but not necessarily if the good is indivisible.
3.1 Introduction
The paper examines trading in a decentralized market with a fixed set of buyers
and sellers who are differentially informed about the value and cost of the traded good.
For this, we follow the Blouin and Serrano (2001) model of a matching and bargaining
game with pairwise meetings, no new entry, and discounting. They show that the
equilibrium allocation of their model is not the ex-ante efficient, rational expectation
allocation even as discounting is removed, assuming that the good is indivisible and
traders can take only one of two bargaining postures. Roughly speaking, this negative
result arises because buyers may try to hold out too long insisting on low prices while
sellers may try to hold out too long insisting on high prices for the market to clear
sufficiently quickly to enable efficient trade.
Golosov et al. (2014) (hereafter GLT) study a variation of the Blouin and Serrano
model in which (i) the good is perfectly divisible, (ii) traders have strictly decreasing
marginal utility for the good, (iii) bargaining postures (prices) are not restricted, and
(iv) instead of discounting there is a probability that the market stops in any period.
In this variation, they study the long run limit allocation that results conditional on
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the event that the market continues to operate in every period and never stops. GLT
show that this long-run allocation is an efficient allocation.
Our aim is clarify the relation between these models and their trading outcomes.
To this end, we introduce a model that can nest critical elements from both setups.
Specifically, we modify Blouin and Serrano (2001) by replacing discounting by a fixed
ending probability and assume that the good is divisible into k parts, with k = 1
corresponding roughly to their setting and k → ∞ roughly to the GLT setting,
albeit with constant marginal valuations. We keep the restriction to two bargaining
postures. Similar to GLT, we restrict the class of equilibria that we consider (while
they impose a symmetry assumption, we impose a monotonicity condition). We
study the properties of the ex-post allocation in our variation, that is, the benchmark
suggested by GLT. We show that for k = 1 (indivisible good), the long-run allocation
is not necessarily efficient. For k →∞, however, the long-run allocation is shown to
be always efficient.
Our analysis suggests that the critical ingredient of the positive result by GLT is
the assumption that the good is divisible but not the assumption that prices can be
freely adjusted. In particular, the restriction to two bargaining postures in Blouin and
Serrano- building on the earlier paper by Wolinsky (1990)- may not be as significant
as previously thought.
Our analysis draws heavily on insights developed in previous work by Tablante
(2015). Tablante studies a steady-state model similar to Wolinsky (1990), examining
the properties of the allocation among entering traders as frictions vanish, akin to the
ex-ante benchmark by Blouin and Serrano and identical to Wolinsky’s own bench-
mark. He shows that the divisibility of the good is critical, replicating Wolinsky’s
negative result when the good is indivisible but showing that the allocation among
entering traders converges to the efficient, rational expectations equilibrium as fric-
tions are removed. The current note complements that paper by studying GLT’s
benchmark of the long-run allocation with trading among a fixed set of buyers and
sellers without new entry.
3.2 Model
The market consists of a continuum of buyers and a continuum of sellers seeking
to trade a single homogeneous good. A binary state of nature determines both seller
costs and buyer values for all agents. There are two states of nature W = {H,L}.
The state H represents the high state and corresponds to high buyer values and high
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seller costs, and the other state (L) for the low state represents low buyer values and
low seller costs.
The game starts in the first period, period 0. The probability of the high state
is 1
2
and the low state is 1
2
. At the start of period 0 there is a continuum of buyers
and a continuum of sellers, each with a mass of 1. The common state of nature is
decided, and a fraction α of both buyers and sellers know the state. These agents
are called informed, and the remaining 1 − α of agents are uninformed, but have a
common prior that the state is high of 1
2
.
The good is broken into k ∈ N pieces and buyers and sellers have a constant
value and cost for each of the k units. Trade takes place over discrete periods,
t ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, ...} starting from an initial period t = 0. The timing for each period is
as follows: first buyers and sellers are randomly matched, then each member of each
pair simultaneously makes an offer, and if offers overlap in a pair then they trade.
Finally, the game ends with probability δ ∈ (0, 1). This risk of ending serves as a
source of friction which encourages agents to trade.
After matching, buyers and sellers simultaneously choose one of two actions A =
{T, S}. An agent who has completed trading automatically plays tough. A buyer
choosing T plays tough, and offers to pay no more than a low price pL for a unit.
Conversely, a seller choosing T offers to sell a unit for no less than a high price pH . A
buyer choosing S plays soft and offers to pay a high price pH , and similarly, a seller
playing S offers to sell a unit for a low price pL.
In a pair, if both the buyer and seller play tough, they do not trade. If at least
one of the two plays soft, and the other has not completed trading, a unit is traded
at a price p ∈ {pL, pM , pH}, with pL < pM < pH . If the buyer plays soft and the
seller tough, then p = pH . If the seller plays soft and the buyer tough, then p = pL.
If both agents in a pair play soft then p = pM . If one plays soft, and the other has
completed trading, then there is no trade, and the agent playing soft observes a very
tough (V T ).
To inform their actions, agents know their personal trading histories and starting
beliefs. An element of a trading history for time t is
et ∈ {(T, T ), (T, S), (S, T ), (S, S), (S, V T ), (V T, S)} where the first element represents
the action the agent took, and the second element is his trading partner’s action in
that period. The history of an agent at the end of period t is denoted by ht ∈ Ht,
where ht = (e0, e1, e2, ..., et), and Ht is the set of all histories of length t. Let r(h) be
the number of times an agent has traded, and rp(h) be the number of times an agent
has traded at a price p. If r(h) = k, an agent can no longer trade.
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To ensure gains from trade and eliminate a pooling equilibrium price, we assume
vH > pH ≥ cH > pM > vL ≥ pL > cL. In the high state, when the game ends, a
buyer with history h receives a payoff of:
r(h)vH − (rH(h)pH + rM(h)pM + rL(h)pL) (3.1)
and the payoff of a buyer in the low state is:
r(h)vL − (rH(h)pH + rM(h)pM + rL(h)pL) . (3.2)
The payoff a seller receives in the high state when the game ends is:
rH(h)pH + rM(h)pM + rL(h)pL − r(h)cH (3.3)
and the payoff of a seller in the low state is:
rH(h)pH + rM(h)pM + rL(h)pL − r(h)cL. (3.4)
3.3 Strategies and Equilibrium
In this section we discuss the interrelated components of an equilibrium.
3.3.1 Strategies
A strategy σ : H × Σ → [0, 1] maps a history and initial belief to a probability
of playing soft. There are six strategies of interest, σUB, σUS, σBH , σBL, σSH , σSL, for
the strategies of uninformed buyers, uninformed sellers, and informed buyers [sellers]
in the high [low] state. For notation we assume that all agents of the same type
follow the same strategy. Because we allow for mixed strategies, this is without loss
of generality.
In an equilibrium, mass functions m : H→ R tell how many agents of a given type
have a given trading history. There are eight mass functions, one for each informed
or uninformed buyer or seller, in the high or low state. Then mUBH(ht) is the mass
of uninformed buyers in the high state having history ht.
3.3.2 Equilibrium
A game is parameterized by (vH , vL, cH , cL, pH , pM , pL, α, k, δ). A Perfect Bayesian
Nash equilibrium of a game, hereafter equilibrium, is a set of strategies such that
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agents maximize expected payoffs.
A proof of equilibrium existence has so far been elusive. The central challenge is
the involvement of the very tough action. In Wolinsky (1990) and Blouin and Serrano
(2001), a strategy can be represented by a single integer or ∞ representing a waiting
time. In Tablante (2015), in an isomorphic game, a strategy can be represented by
a finite set of integers or ∞. In the current model, an agent can encounter either
a tough or a very tough while not trading. These two signals may move an agent’s
belief in opposing directions and make equilibrium existence much more difficult to
show.
3.3.3 Efficiency
There are two questions we seek to address in the model: if the game continues
arbitrarily long, do all the potential trades take place, and do all agents learn the
state. To answer these questions we define a few benchmarks.
Definition 10 (Ex Post Efficiency). A sequence of equilibria indexed i is ex post
efficient if:
1. lim
i→∞
lim
t→∞
∑
ht∈Ht
(
mUBHi (h
t)r(ht) +mIBHi (h
t)r(ht)
ki
)
= 1, and
2. lim
i→∞
lim
t→∞
∑
ht∈Ht
(
mUBLi (h
t)r(ht) +mIBLi (h
t)r(ht)
ki
)
= 1.
Ex post efficiency states that all buyers in the high and low states have traded all
their units, which implies that all sellers have traded as well.
3.4 Results
This section will demonstrate how information asymmetry can lead to inefficiency,
before showing that divisibility of trade eliminates that inefficiency. The next lemma
will show that the informed are not the source of inefficiency, and will be useful for
later proofs.
3.4.1 Partial Equilibrium Characterization
Lemma 10 (Informed Trade). In any equilibrium, the following are true:
1. lim
t→∞
∑
ht∈H
mIBH(ht)r(ht)
αk
= 1.
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2. lim
t→∞
∑
ht∈H
mISL(ht)r(ht)
αk
= 1.
Lemma 10 states that in any equilibrium there is some t after which almost all
of the units of informed buyers [sellers] will have been bought [sold] in the high [low]
state. The idea is that there is some period after which uninformed sellers [buyers]
will no longer be making a significant fraction of mistakes. Because no more mistakes
are made, and due to the discount rate, informed buyers [sellers] will try to trade all
their units by playing soft.
It is worth noting that a decreasing fraction of informed agents may be unable
to trade due to the possibility of always encountering match partners who have com-
pleted trading.
Proof. Let s = lim
t→∞
∑
ht∈Ht
mUBL(ht)
(
rM(ht) + rH(ht)
)
k
. This is the fraction of trades
uninformed buyers do incorrectly in the low state. Because agents can trade a maxi-
mum of k times, s is bounded.
Let sLt = s−
∑
ht∈Ht
mUBL(ht)
(
rM(ht) + rH(ht)
)
k
. This is the fraction of trades that
have yet to be executed by period t in the low state. By construction, lim
t→∞
sLt = 0.
Let C(h) denote the continuation value after h. Let dLt be the probability of
encountering a buyer who has completed his trades in period t and so plays very
tough. Let sLt be the probability of encountering a buyer playing soft in a period t.
We will compare the value of playing tough and soft.
Let vs be the value of playing soft after some history h, then:
vs = sLt(pM−cL+δC(h, (S, S)))+(1−dLt−sLt)(vH−pH+δC(h, (S, T )))+dLtδC(h, (S, V T )),
and the value to playing tough vt is:
vt = sLt(pH − cL + δC(h, (S, S))) +dLtδC(h, (T, V T )) + (1−dLt− sLt)δ(C(h, (T, T ))).
Because an informed agent’s belief does not change, all that matters for her contin-
uation payoff is the number of units left to trade, so C(h, (T, V T )) = C(h, (S, V T )).
Because lim
t→∞
sLt = 0, the difference (vs− vt) becomes:
lim
t→∞
(vs− vt) = (1− dLt)(vH − pH + δC(h, (S, T )))− (1− dLt)δC(h, (T, T )) (3.5)
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The value of a single unit is upper bounded: C(h, (T, T ))−C(h, (S, T )) ≤ sLt(vH−
pL) + (vH − pH), so that (3.5) is bounded again:
lim
t→∞
(vs− vt) ≥ (1− dLt)(vH − pH − δ(vH − pH)) > 0. (3.6)
Thus there is some period t after which all informed sellers play soft in the low
state.
Definition 11 (Trade is on Average Ex Post Rational). In an equilibrium trade is
on average ex post rational if in every period t, the following two are true:
•
∑
ht∈H
mUBH(ht)σUB(ht) ≥
∑
ht∈H
mUBL(ht)σUB(ht).
•
∑
ht∈H
mUSL(ht)σUS(ht) ≥
∑
ht∈H
mUSH(ht)σUS(ht).
This is a monotonicity condition which states that the uninformed play soft more
correctly than incorrectly, and is analogous to Tablante (2015, Lemma 4). So far the
proof that trade is on average ex post rational holds in every equilibrium has been
elusive. There are several ways the proof of this might work. One approach would be
to try to prove a stronger property. The first step would be to take two histories of the
same length ht and ht1 such that r(h
t) < r(ht1) and the buyer’s belief that the state is
higher after ht than ht1, and show that if σ
UB(ht) > 0 then σUB(ht1) = 1. The second
step would show that encountering a trading partner playing soft always decreases
a buyer’s belief that the state is high. Both of these steps are confounded by the
non-stationary nature of the game. Furthermore, while the first step is intuitive, it is
possible that an agent may want to play soft in order to encounter a match partner
playing ‘very tough’ and gain information from that. The second step is made more
difficult by the fact that uninformed buyers with a lower belief might be more likely
to play soft in a later period than an earlier period.
3.4.2 Granular Trade Precludes Efficiency
If the good is indivisible, then for some parameter settings not all trades will take
place. The reason for this is that learning is more difficult when there are fewer trades
from which to learn.
Example 1. Consider the following parameter setting.
84
vH 99 vL 3
pH 98 pL 2
cH 97 cL 1
pM 50 α 0.1
k 1 δ 0.9
Notice that this game is symmetric for buyers and sellers. One equilibrium is as
follows: all informed buyers in the high state and informed sellers in the low state
play soft in the first period, and uninformed buyers and sellers play tough in every
period. Thus trade only happens in the first period, and not all the gains from trade
are achieved.
To show that this is an equilibrium we must consider σUB, σUS, σBH , σBL, σSH , σSL.
Clearly the latter four are optimal, but consider σUB and σUS. After a first period
history of (T, S), an agent is done trading, and so plays tough in subsequent periods.
After a history of (T, T ), (T, T ), ... a buyer’s [seller’s] belief that the state is high [low]
is 0.5
0.5+0.5·0.9 ≈ 0.53. Given this belief and the knowledge that no trading partner will
play soft, the expected payoff of playing soft is clearly negative. Thus σUB(·) = 0 and
σUS(·) = 0 are optimal.
To show that this is the only equilibrium, suppose that another equilibrium exists
in which an uninformed agent plays soft in some period. Take the earliest period
t in which an uninformed agent (for notation, a buyer) plays soft. Prior to that
only informed agents may have played soft, and the likelihood of having encountered
one is at most 0.1. The posterior belief that the state is high based on not having
encountered a seller playing soft is then at most 0.53. Let sH be the probability of
encountering a seller playing soft in period t if the state is high, and let sL be the
probability of encountering a seller playing soft in period t if the state is low. If the
buyer encounters a seller playing very tough, his belief does not change and he faces
an isomorphic problem with a new sH and sL, so this possibility is omitted. Because
the buyer plays soft, the following two inequalities are true:
0.53(99− 50sH − 98(1− sH)) + 0.47(3− 50sL − 98(1− sL)) ≥ 0, (3.7)
and
0.53(99−50sH−98(1−sH))+0.47(3−50sL−98(1−sL)) ≥ 0.53sH(99−2)+0.47sL(3−2).
(3.8)
The first inequality states that the payoff to playing soft exceeds zero, and the second
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inequality states that the payoff to playing soft exceeds the payoff to playing tough.
It is straightforward that (3.7) and (3.8) cannot be satisfied simultaneously, thus no
equilibrium in which an uninformed agent plays soft can exist. Since no uninformed
will play soft in any equilibrium, informed will play soft in the first period.
3.4.3 Good Divisibility Promotes Trading
If the good is made increasingly divisible, then the problem of an insufficient
signal for learning is overcome, and it is possible for all the trade to take place. This
is because uninformed agents can learn the true state to take advantage of profitable
trades.
Proposition 1. Any sequence of equilibria indexed i, in which ki →∞ and trade is
on average ex post rational, is ex post efficient.
The proof proceeds by contradiction and assumes a subsequence of inefficient
equilibria. First we show that informed must play soft for a significant fraction of
periods. As k grows large, after many periods uninformed agents will be able to learn
from these trades. Finally, because uninformed learn, they will complete all of their
trades as well.
Proof. Take any sequence of equilibria indexed i in which trade is on average ex post
rational and ki → ∞. Suppose for some  > 0 there is a subsequence of equilibria
indexed i′ such that ∀i′,∀t,
∑
ht∈Ht
mUSLi′ (h
t)r(ht)
(1− α)ki′ < 1 − .We will restrict attention to
this subsequence and show that if such a subsequence exists, uninformed can learn
and so trade.
Step 1: ∀i′, lim
t→∞
∑
ht∈Ht
mISLi′ (h
t)
(
rM(ht) + rL(ht)
)
αki′
≥ .
The first step states that informed sellers play soft for a significant fraction of
trades in each equilibrium. This is shown by contradiction. From the continuum of
agents, uninformed and informed sellers will encounter buyers playing soft in equal
proportions. Thus in any equilibrium and for any t:
∑
ht∈Ht
mUSL(ht)(r(ht))
(1− α)k ≥
∑
ht∈Ht
mISL(ht)(rH(ht))
αk
. (3.9)
The left hand side of (3.9) is the fraction of trades uninformed sellers have made,
while the right hand side of (3.9) is the fraction of trades informed sellers have made
from buyers playing soft by some period in the low state.
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Because the left side of (3.9) is less than 1 − , and lim
t→∞
∑
ht∈Ht
mISL(ht)r(ht)
αk
= 1
from Lemma 10, lim
t→∞
∑
ht∈Ht
mISLi′ (h
t)
(
rM(ht) + rL(ht)
)
αki′
≥ . This provides a lower
bound on the signal uninformed buyers can use to learn.
Step 2: Let h˜Hti and h˜
Lt
i be a random variable for the history of an un-
informed buyer in the high and low states after t periods in equilibrium
i. Let βi(h) be an uninformed buyer’s belief after h. Then there is a se-
quence {ti} such that for any sequence {ti} satisfying ti > ti, plim
i→∞
βi(h˜
Hti
i ) = 1.
Let ti be the earliest period such that
∑
hti∈Hti
mSLi (h
ti)(rL(hti) + rM(hti))
αki
≥ 
2
,
which must exist from Step 1 and Lemma 10.
In an equilibrium, let
fL(t) =
t∑
t=0
∑
ht∈Ht
mUSL(ht)σUS(ht) +mSL(ht)σSL(ht)
k
,
and
fH(t) =
t∑
t=0
∑
ht∈Ht
mUSH(ht)σUS(ht) +mSH(ht)σSH(ht)
k
.
These are the mass of softs that have been played in the high and low states
up to period t. Recall that because playing soft for a seller is a dominated strategy,
σSH(·) = 0. From Step 1, there is an t such that for t > t, informed sellers have traded
at a low or medium price at least 
2
times and so have played soft at least 
2
times.
From this and the fact that trade is on average ex post rational, fL(t) ≥ fH(t) + 
2
.
We will now focus on uninformed buyers. Let w(h) be the number of times a buyer
encounters a seller playing soft in history h.
Take a sequence {ti} such that ti > ti. Consider the sequence of random variables
w(h˜Ltii ) and w(h˜
Hti
i ). That is, consider the number of times an uninformed buyer
encounters sellers playing soft. In an equilibrium, w(h˜Ltii ) and w(h˜
Hti
i ) each follow
the Poisson binomial distribution, because in each there are ti independent draws from
ti Bernoulli distributions. Furthermore, the mean of
w(h˜
Lti
i )
ki
is fLi (ti) which satisfies
0 ≤ fHi (ti) < fHi (ti) + 2 ≤ fLi (ti) ≤ 1, and the variance is:
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t∑
t=0
∑
ht∈Ht
(
mUSLi (h
t)σUSi (h
t) +mSLi (h
t)σSLi (h
t)
) (
1−mUSLi (ht)σUSi (ht) +mSLi (ht)σSLi (ht)
)
k2i
which approaches 0 as i→∞, so plim
i→∞
(
w(h˜Ltii )
ki
− fLi (ti)
)
= 0. Similarly the mean of
w(h˜
Hti
i )
ki
is fHtii and the variance of
w(h
Hti
i )
ki
converges to 0 so that plim
i→∞
(
w(h˜Htii )
ki
− fHi (ti)
)
=
0.
Finally, because lim
i→∞
Pr{w(h˜
Hti
i )
ki
> fLi (ti) +

2
} = 0 and lim
i→∞
Pr{w(h˜
Hti
i )
ki
<
fLi (ti) +

2
} = 1, plim
i→∞
βi(h˜
Hti
i ) = 1.
Step 3: There is a sequence {ti} such that:
lim
i→∞
 ∑
ht∈Ht|t>ti,r(ht)<ki
mUBHi (h
t)σUBi (h
t) +
∑
ht∈Ht|t>ti,r(ht)=ki
mUBHi (h
t)
 = 1− α.
This states that at some point almost all the uninformed will either have com-
pleted trading or be playing soft in every period. This will complete the proof of
the proposition and is proven by examining the payoff of playing soft relative to the
payoff of paying tough.
In some equilibrium i and some period t, let sHti and s
Lt
i be the probabilities
of encountering a seller playing soft in the high and low states, sHti and s
Lt
i be the
remaining mass of softs in the high and low states, and dHti and d
Lt
i be the probabilities
of encountering a seller playing very tough in the high and low states. Let Ci(h) be
the continuation payoff after a history h.
For some history h, if r(h) < k then the payoff to playing tough is:
vt = βi(h)
(
sHti (v
H − pL + δCi(h, (T, S))) + (1− sHti )δCi(h, (T, T ))
)
+ (1− βi(h))
(
sLti (v
L − pL + δCi(h, (T, S))) + (1− sLti )δCi(h, (T, T ))
)
and the payoff to playing soft is:
vs = βi(h)
(
sHti (v
H − pM + δCi(h, (S, S))) + (1− sHti − dHti )(vH − pH + δCi(h, (S, T ))) + dHti δCi(h, (S, V T ))
)
+ (1− βi(h))
(
sLti (v
L − pM + δCi(h, (S, S))) + (1− sLti − dLti )(vL − pH + δCi(h, (S, S))) + dLti δCi(h, (S, V T ))
)
.
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We suppress the arguments (h, i, t) of vt and vs for clarity. For ti > ti, plim
i→∞
βi(h˜
Hti
i ) =
1. As t→∞, sH → 0, sL → 0 so that the difference in payoffs becomes:
lim
i→∞
lim
t→∞(vs−vt) = (1−d
Ht
i )(v
H−pH+δCi(h, (S, T )))+dHti δCi(h, (S, V T ))−δCi(h, (T, T )).
(3.10)
Because both plim βi(h˜
Hti
i , (T, T )) = 1 and plim βi(h˜
Hti
i , (S, V T )) = 1,
plim
(
Ci(h˜
Hti
i , (T, T ))− Ci(h˜Htii , (S, V T ))
)
= 01. Finally because
Ci(h, (T, T ))−Ci(h, (S, T )) < βi(h)(sHti
δ
1− δ (v
H−pL)+(vH−pH))+(1−βi(h))sLti
δ
1− δ (v
L−pL)
which converges to vH − pH as βi(h) → 1 and sHti → 0, we can bound (vs − vt) to
find that:
plim
i→∞,t→∞
(vs− vt) ≥ (1− dHti )(1− δ)(vH − pH) > 0. (3.11)
Thus, as βi(h˜
Hti) converges in probability to 1 and t→∞ so that the other limits
hold, for almost all buyers in the high state either vs−vt > 0 or they have completed
trading.
The proof is symmetric for sellers in the low state, so that the sequence of equilibria
is ex post efficient.
Divisibility is important for efficiency because it allows the beliefs of uninformed
agents to approach the truth arbitrarily close.
3.5 Conclusion
In this research we have studied information aggregation and efficiency in a de-
centralized market, and identified weaker conditions are necessary for learning and
efficiency than the conditions found in past research. In particular we have provided
evidence that the indivisibility of trade is the significant friction which can preclude
learning and efficiency, and that flexible prices are not necessary. Furthermore, our
research demonstrates that learning can be completely achieved as a passive process,
unlike past research which requires agents carefully select bargaining postures in order
to learn. While learning may be faster if agents carefully craft offers to investigate
1Trivially, C is continuous in the belief. C is bounded between 0 and 11−δ (v
H − pL) and so far
any k, h, and h′ such that r(h) = r(h′), as βi(h)− βi(h′)→ 0 then C(h)− C(h′)→ 0.
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the state, this research finds that agents can learn by behaving passively and insisting
on favorable prices while observing the actions of their match partners.
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